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I. INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 
Some cases are simply too complicated for judges and juries 
to manage. This complexity can arise for a wide variety of 
reasons. As Dickens realized long ago, the law itself can be the 
source of complexity.1 In dealing with most of these difficul-
1. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Nonnan Page ed., Penguin 
Books 1971) (1853). The book revolves around Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, an 
interminable proceeding in the Court of Chancery. 
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ties, there have been no formal tools available either to identi-
fy tough cases or to help resolve them. We have simply trusted 
judges and juries to apply the law as best as they can. Most 
scholars attempt to tackle legal complexity in the large, taking 
on a wide variety of factors that contribute to the problem. 
While such works succeed in raising a wide variety of issues 
surrounding legal complexity, by their very nature such ambi-
tious agendas offer less in the way of concrete results and 
solutions. 
This article offers a partial remedy to this quandary. Com-
putational complexity theory ("CCT"), a mathematical theory of 
complexity developed by computer scientists over the last forty 
years, yields some provable limits to our capacity to find facts 
and apply legal rules to them.2 This article applies CCT's pre-
cise definition of complexity to demonstrate some surprising 
results about seemingly simple laws. On a more general level, 
it helps to explain a number of broad contours in our legal 
2. CCT should not be confused with Chaos Theory, the study of 
nonlinear equations that exhibit, inter alia, large changes in response to 
small perturbations, and that go through complex, recurring patterns. 
Recent scholarship has explored the implications of Chaos Theory for a 
wide variety of legal areas. For the area of securities law, see Lawrence 
A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:. The Linear 
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 546 (1994). For the legislative process, see Vincent Di Lorenzo, 
Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 425 
(1994). For jurisprudence, see Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory & the Jus-
tice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1993). For administrative 
law, see J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical 
Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionalism and 
the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996). For the evolu-
tion of the legal system, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos & Evolution in Law & 
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law & Society and 
its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). For 
a collection of other cites, see Di Lorenzo, supra, at 428 n.20. 
This is the first article to apply CCT to legal problems. More gener-
ally, CCT has rarely been used outside of the computer science communi-
ty. Recently economists have begun to draw on CCT to formalize the 
complexity of some of the systems they model. See Graciela Chichilnisky 
& Geoffrey Heal, Catastrophe Futures: Financial Markets and Changing 
Climate Risks 8-9 (April 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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terrain. 
It is important to emphasize that CCT addresses only a 
subset of the issues surrounding legal complexity. The "return" 
for this narrower focus is a much deeper understanding of the 
difficulties when they arise. This is an age-old trade-off: for-
mal, precise methods provide greater understanding than 
vague intuition, but we can apply them only when all there-
quired assumptions hold. 
Part II surveys the literature on legal complexity and con-
cludes by contrasting CCT with existing approaches. In the 
process of laying out the terrain of legal complexity, this over-
view offers a sprinkling of comparisons and contrasts between 
the focus of existing scholarship and CCT. This groundwork is 
designed to help readers see what sorts of complexity issues 
CCT does, and does not, address. 
Part III provides a layperson's introduction to CCT. Part IV 
applies the theory to show that specific rules, from mortgage 
priorities to bankruptcy reorganization classes to the scope of 
conspiracies, along with some contractual terms, can place 
effectively impossible demands on any trier of fact. Part V uses 
CCT to provide novel explanations for, and justifications of, the 
judiciary's aversion to multi-party disputes, and the existence 
of private property systems. It concludes by noting some strong 
parallels between CCT and Lon Fuller's famous article on the 
limits of adjudication.3 Part VI returns to the more mundane 
examples of Part III and provides some suggestions for courts 
facing intractable cases. 
II. CONVENTIONAL VIEWS OF LEGAL COMPLEXITY (OR THE 
COMPLEXITY OF LAWS) 
Legal scholars have not had an easy time defining com plexi.-
ty, and some have been disarmingly honest about this difficul-
ty. One author admitted that he was tempted to define com-
plexity by averring, "I know it when I read it."4 Commenting 
3. Lon Fuller, The Form & Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 
353 (1978). 
4. Lance W. Rook, Laying Down the Law: Canons for Drafting Com-
plex Legislation, 72 OR. L. REV. 663, 669 (1993). Rook seems to be para-
phrasing, sub silentio, Justice Stewart's infamous declaration that, while 
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on the notorious complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, 
another scholar asserted that, "[n]either 'tax simplification' nor 
its mirror image, complexity, is a concept that can be easily 
defined or measured. I know of no comprehensive analytic 
framework for these ideas, nor any empirical study that sup-
plies a 'simplicity index' in particular areas of tax law prac-
tice."5 
Undeterred by the lack of the sort of "comprehensive analyt-
ic framework" that CCT provides for certain types of com plexi-
ty, scholars have appealed to everyday, intuitive definitions of 
complexity. Across a wide range of topics, from tax law to envi-
ronmental law, and from rules in the abstract to litigation in 
the courtroom, previous work has fleshed out the meaning of 
legal complexity via laundry lists of "factors" or "sources." 
While no strong consensus exists on the most important sourc-
es of legal complexity, the following section summarizes the 
mo~t prominent themes that occur in literature. Again, the pri-
mary purpose of this survey of literature is to focus on the 
subset of complexity issues addressed by CCT. 
A. Traditional Types of Legal Complexity 
1. The World Itself 
Perhaps the most commonly cited culprit for the complexity 
of laws and legal systems is the world we live in (and have in 
large part created).6 In societies consisting of millions of citi-
zens with many conflicting aspirations, it is no surprise that 
legal systems, designed to harmonize disputes, become com-
plex.7 
Peter Schuck defines density as the amount of behavior that 
he could not define hard-core pornography, "I know it when I see it." 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). · 
5. Boris Bittker, Tax Reform & Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1974). 
6. See Barbara Fishbein, Book Note, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 613, 
614 (1983) (reviewing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 
(1983)). 
7. See David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The 
Unwarranted Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 771, 771 
(1991) (noting that the certainty for recovery has eroded as the tort law 
has developed). 
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a body of law attempts to regulate, and argues that this is a 
major source of complexity.8 To the extent that people in soci-
ety have intricate relationships, i.e., to the extent the world 
the law attempts to regulate is complex, so too must the law be 
complex. Schuck cites pension law as an example of dense 
laws-rules that are complex because they regulate a myriad 
of issues between employers, employees, and the government 
as regulator.9 
Perhaps an even more compelling example of complexity 
driven by the intricacy of human affairs is tax law. Since the 
inception of the federal income tax, commentators have viewed 
complexity as virtually inevitable.10 A British expert, reflect-
ing on the complexity of the United States' first income tax 
statute, smugly noted "[t]here is the usual failure to see that 
modern life and modern commerce are so complex and diversi-
fied that to expect a tax form which shall read like a pill ad-
vertisement on the railway, and yet close down upon every 
case, is asking for the moon."11 · 
Later, leading American tax scholars have echoed this senti-
ment. "[C]omplexity is in large part a result of the fact that 
our complicated tax rules are applicable to an enormously 
complex economic and legal system. Clearly, such a society 
both engenders and demands a complex tax system."12 "It is 
unfortunately the fact that, by its very nature, a tax on income 
must take account of an almost infinite spectrum of business, 
investment, and personal events and transactions ... . Income 
taxation entails a high level of irreducible complexity."13 
8. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequenc-
es, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992). 
9. See id. at 3-4. 
10. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justi-
fying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 
n.25 (1993) (discussing the intricacy and the degree of complexity in-
volved in federal income tax law). 
11. Robert B. Eichholz, Should the Federal Tax Be Simplified?, 48 
YALE L.J . 1200, 1212 (1939) (citing Dr. J.C. Stamp, Testimony before the 
British Royal Commission on the Income Tax (August 1, 1919), in Cmd. 
1920, 615 Minutes of Evidence, I, CJI 9481). 
12. Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The 
Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB .. 
673, 686 (1969). 
13. Bittker, supra note 5, at 2. More recent works on the complexity 
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One reply to this justification for the tax laws' complexity is 
that the opportunities for technological improvements in the 
administration of, and compliance with, the tax system should 
be at least as great as the opportunities for technological im-
provements in other areas of the economy. "The tax system 
should enjoy net efficiency gains like the gains enjoyed by the 
[rest] of the economy."14 Indeed, tax law seems precisely like 
the kind of formal, mechanical set of rules for which computers 
are ideally suited, to manage more and more complexity with 
fewer and fewer (human) headaches. CCT shows, however, 
that this intuition is not always correct.15 
Scholars in other areas have, like tax experts, argued that 
the complexity of the real world "entails a high level of irreduc-
ible complexity" in the law. Eric Orts has criticized 
contractarian and law and economics approaches to corporate 
law because they ignore "the complex nature of the relation-
ships about which corporate law is concerned."16 "[R]ecent at-
tempts to define or formulate a unified theory of 'the 
corporation' fail to account for the complexity of corporate 
law."17 He argued that "[f]orcing the [complex] world into rigid 
theoretical boxes is dangerous,"18 and like Bittker, feels that 
corporate law is irreducibly complex. Alyson Flournoy similar-
ly argues that "the ever-increasing complexity that characteriz-
es our relationship to the environment"19 has undermined 
simple cost-benefit analysis of environmental problems. 
of the Internal Revenue Code continue to make the same point: "Whatev-
er tax law we adopt must apply to a large, multi-faceted world that has 
generated intricate economic arrangements." Edward J .. McCaffery, The 
Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, Wis. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (1990). 
14. Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, The Enormous Complexity of Being Fair, 
66 TAX NOTES 1711, 1711 (1995). 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity & Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1575 (1993). 
17. I d. at 1566. 
18. ld. at 1623. 
19. Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27 Lo~. L.A. L. REV. 
809, 809 (1994). 
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2. Multifaceted Notions of Justice 
AI; these critics imply, laws could be much simpler, even 
given the complexity of human affairs, if society strived for 
fewer and simpler ideals. If, for instance, we decided that all 
laws should aim only to increase economic output in the short 
run, environmental law would become much simpler (or per-
haps disappear). There are, of course, objections to creating 
laws that serve such simple goals. AI; a practical matter, no-
tions of justice and fairness are also important determinants of 
legal rules. They compound the legal complexity caused by the 
real world. 
Even seemingly simple conceptions of fairness quickly lead 
to more complex laws. Tax law, for instance, uses such seem-
ingly straightforward notions as horizontal equity: similar 
treatment of taxpayers in similar situations.20 Yet when legis-
lators and courts deal with a myriad of situations in the real 
world, they must add layer after layer of rules to preserve even 
t~e simplest types of fairness. "Much of our [tax law] statutory 
detail arises from the feeling that this pressure for fairness 
should-in fairness-be satisfied."21 
Of course, most notions of fairness and justice are not nearly 
as simple as horizontal equity. More intricate definitions create 
what John Miller, in discussing tax law, calls judgrriental com-
plexity: "the intellectual, moral, and philosophical burdens a 
tax question may pose."22 He finds that "[m]ost often judg-
mental complexity arises because more than one rule or princi-
ple may apply to a given taxable event, and those potentially 
applicable principles are in conflict."23 Multiple and conflicting 
20. For a traditional definition of horizontal equity, see RICHARD A. 
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PuBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 223 (5th ed. 1989). Recent scholarship has questioned whether 
horizontal equity has any content beyond vertical equity, the principle 
that those with higher incomes should pay more taxes. See generally 
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Kaplow, Horizontal Equity]; see also 
Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992) 
[hereinafter Kaplow, Note on Horizontal Equity]. 
21. Surrey, supra note 12, at 700. 
22. Miller, supra note 10, at 12. 
23. I d. For a similar observation in a different area of the law, see 
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goals translate into more complex rules. 
Ronald Dworkin has vividly described the difficulty of trying 
to harmonize complex and divergent ideas of justice. It takes a 
Hercules of a judge, he maintains, to construct "coherent" laws 
that form a "seamless web" that will bring justice in line with 
a society's ideals.24 Dworkin argues that it is a judge's duty to 
strive for the Herculean ideal regardless of the difficulty (or 
impossibility) of the task. For Dworkin, as for these other 
scholars, complex laws are the inevitable price of multi-dimen-
sional_ definitions of justice. 
3. Indeterminacy 
Without rules to resolve conflict between different priri.ciples 
of justice, a legal system is facially inconsistent-it is 
overdetermined and thus there are no "right" outcomes in 
many cases. This seems unacceptable. Ideally, rules designed 
to control conflict between the different aspects of justice lead 
to a unique solution in every case. This, however, is quite diffi-
cult to achieve. 
Instead, legal rules often appear indeterminate. They admit 
of more than one solution. Schuck argues that indeterminate 
rules lead to complexity because they are "open-textured, flexi-
ble, multi-factored, and fluid . . . . [T]urning on diverse mix-
tures of fact and policy, indeterminate rules tend to be costly 
to apply and their outcomes are often hard to predict.'125 
Schuck cites the reasonableness standard in tort law as one 
example of an indeterminate rule that introduces complexity 
into the legal system.26 
McCaffery notes that foundational terms in the tax laws are 
not tightly defined. ''For example, for the traditional income 
tax, these will involve questions of measurement, attribution, 
and timing."27 Measurement of income sounds simple enough, 
but case law reveals the unending dispute over what does and 
Orts, supra note 16, at 1566·67 ("Corporate law is complex because it 
embodies a set of conflicting normative principles."). 
24. RoNALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239·40, 264, 354, 379·91 (1986). 
25. Schuck, supra note 8, at 4. ' 
26. See id. at 11. 
27. McCaffery, supra note 13, at 1274. 
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what does not fall under the rubric of "income."28 Congress 
left the law in a highly indeterminate state when it specified 
the base of the income tax as "all income from whatever source 
derived.'~ 
Schuck notes that the usual cure for indeterminacy, more 
rules, may itself introduce further complexity.30 .McCaffery 
labels this "dynamic complexity,"31 an iterative battle between 
taxpayers finding loopholes under an indeterminate revenue 
code, and the IRS continually attempting to plug those loop-
holes.32 Reductions in complexity via reduced indeterminacy 
seem to be offset by greater technical complexity. 
Miller argues that indeterminacy, and the complexity it 
engenders, is not necessarily a bad thing. Detailed rules are 
more deterministic, but Miller argues that they end up being 
arbitrary or unjust in many cases.33 More general principles, 
though indeterminate, can seem more fair. This is nothing 
more than the age-old tension between rule of law (determi-
nate, but potentially heartless) and rule of men (less determi-
nate law varying from judge to judge, but hopefully suffused 
with flexible standards of justice). As previously intimated,34 
justice, by requiring indeterminacy, may make complex legal 
rules inevitable. 
4. Cognitive Difficulties 
The previous sections have focused on complexity stemming 
from the intricacies of the real world, the cross-currents in 
widely held notions of justice, and the ambiguities inherent in 
28. For two of the more famous cases on the subtleties in fleshing the 
seemingly simple definition of "gross income" (defined as "all income from 
whatever source derived," 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1994)), see Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (holding that a stock dividend on com-
mon stock is not gross income). For a further discussion, see also Com-
missioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) {holding that puni-
tive damages awards are included in gross income). 
29. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a). 
30. See Schuck, supra note 8, at 4. 
31. McCaffery, supra note 13, at 1275-76. 
32. See id. 
33. See Miller, supra note 10, at 22. 
34. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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indeterminate rules. Cognitive issues focus more closely on the 
relationship between rules, and the human minds that produce 
them. Analogizing it to arithmetic, here are two ways of saying 
the same thing: 
2=2 
177,991 - 88,427 + 901 - 109,280 + 18,817 = J~ x dx + 
(sin(45°)? log21"2 + Y2(sin2x + cos2x) 
The first expression is verifiable on sight; the second requires 
some work. It is easy to recognize the validity of the first, but 
the second poses greater cognitive difficulties. 
Ideally, legal rules should be comprehensible on a quick read 
by a nonspecialist.35 In practice, many statutes (and common 
law rules) are what Schuck calls technical.36 They are intri-
cate and require specialized skill to manage efficiently. The tax 
code is his prototypical example of technical rules.37 
McCaffery, using the same label, defines technical as "the pure 
intellectual difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of tax 
law."38 Although he uses a different label, Miller cites the 
same problem with tax law. "[E]laborative complexity relates 
· to the level of information and education that must be ab-
sorbed in order to begin to decide a tax question. Thus, the 
· length and detail of tax rules, along with their interconnected-
ness, are directly related to their elaborative complexity."39 
Miller agrees that "[t]he problems associated with elaborative 
complexity are a function of human frailty."40 Technical 
(elaborative) rules present cognitive difficulties for people. In 
discussing what makes some statutes difficult to parse, Rook 
identifies three common attributes that people find vexing: 
35. This perspective sounds innocuous and most scholars discussing 
legal complexity seem to accept it, yet it could well have served as the 
motto of iconoclastic Legal Realists earlier in this century. See WILLIAM 
TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 70-73 (1973) 
(discussing Legal Realism in the ·1930s). 
36. See Schuck, supra note 8, at 4. 
37. See id. 
38. McCaffery, supra note 13, at 1274. 
39. Miller, supra note 10, at 12. 
40. ld. at 12. 
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(1) exceptions within exceptions within exceptions ... ; 
(2) verbal representations of mathematical relationships; and 
(3) cross-references to other rules. 41 
Empirical work indicates that cognitive problems figure 
prominently in the difficulty people have with laws. Statistical 
results from a survey of tax experts indicate that (i) excessive 
detail of statutory and regulatory provisions, and (ii) require-
ments of numerous calculations, together, explain most of what 
experts label as complex rules.42 CCT, as we shall see, deals 
with aspects of complexity entirely removed from such cogni-
tive shortcomings of human beings. 
B. Litigation Complexity 
So far this article has focused on literature analyzing the 
complexity of legal rules in and of themselves, outside of addi-
tional complications caused by actual litigation. CCT applies 
only to such "pure" rule complexity. In order to clarify the 
issues addressed by this article, however, it is useful to briefly 
discuss work on the complexity of litigation. The article then 
returns to rule complexity and summarizes the main norma-
tive explanations for it. 
While the complexity of litigation is not entirely a modem 
phenomenon,43 modern interest was triggered in large part by 
the difficulties the federal courts were facing with the increas-
ingly larger antitrust suits that arose after World War II. The 
first systematic effort to prescribe techniques for judges (and to 
a lesser extent lawyers) to deal with such cases defined com-
plex litigation in highly functional terms: "cases which present 
unusual problems and . .. require extraordinary treatment, 
including but not limited to the cases described as 'protracted' 
or 'big.""'4 The defmition in the third version of this treatise 
has changed little: "the need for [judicial] management ... is 
41. Rook, supra note 4, at 669-70. Note that attempting to design a 
systematic procedure to check for certain types of cross-referencing prob-
lems, such as circular referencing, is futile. See infra Part liLA. 
42. See Susan B. Long & Judyth A. Swingen, An Approach to the 
Measurement of Tax Law Complexity, 8 J. AM. TAX Ass'N 22, 32 tbl. 7. 
43. See, e.g., DICKENS, supra note 1. 
44. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3 (3d ed. 1995) (quoting the 
first edition definition of complex litigation) [hereinafter THE MANuAL]. 
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[the] defining characteristic: The greater the need for manage-
ment, the more 'complex' is the litigation."45 
In discussing the complexity of different substantive areas of 
the law, The Manual seems to -explain complex litigation in 
terms of (i) the complexity of the real world (that the law al-
lows to enter as evidence),46 and (ii) cognitive difficulties for 
judges, lawyers, and juries.47 For instance, The Manual attrib-
utes the complexity of antitrust cases to "voluminous documen-
tary and testimonial evidence, extensive discovery, complicated 
legal, factual, and technical (particularly econ·omic) ques-
tions . . . . "48 The focus on volume of evidence seems to indi-
cate that antitrust law does not abstract from the complexity of 
real-world economic relationships. Parties can submit evidence 
on a wide range of issues, and the judge and jury are left to 
sort out the factual mess. The Manual's discussion of compli-
cated and technical questions of law and fact seem to refer to 
cognitive difficulties faced by judges and juries. The same is 
true for The Manual's description of complexity in patent cas-
es. "The principal source of complexity in patent litigation 
generally is the technical nature of the subject matter. Its 
unfamiliarity poses unique problems for judges and juries."49 
45. /d. For a similar functional definition, see Jay Tidmarsh, Unat-
tainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judi-
cial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1691 n.21 (1992) ("my search 
for a definition of 'complex litigation' is limited to the context of proce-
dural reform: What meaning should we give to 'complex litigation' if we 
are going to create special rules to handle it?"). Both The Manual and 
Tidmarsh focus on the judge's role, and to a lesser extent, the lawyer's 
role in complex litigation. For a discussion of the jury's role, see general-
ly Roger W. Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982) (advocating use of the judge-jury historical test 
in ascertaining the role of juries in complex litigation). 
46. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
4 7. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
48. THE MANuAL, supra note 44, § 33.1. 
49. Id. § 33.6. Jay Tidmarsh, supra note 45, at 1757-58, 1766, also 
discusses real-world complexity and cognitive difficulties as significant 
sources of complexity in litigation. He labels lawyers' difficulty in formu-
lating simple legal theories formulational complexity, and argues that it 
is, in large part, a product of informational overload. See id. at 1757-58. 
He labels factfinders' difficulty in weighing evidence decisionmaking com-
plexity and argues that the "factfinder may not have the intellectual 
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Another complicating factor The Manual mentions repeated-
ly is multiplicity of parties and disputes. "[L]itigation involving 
many parties in numerous related cases ... requires manage-
ment and is complex .... "50 In mass tort cases, for instance, 
which often involve multiple plaintiffs and defendants, 
"[p]ronounced conflicts may exist among the defendants, and 
the filing of third-party complaints may result in the joinder of 
numerous additional parties."51 Jay Tidmarsh also cites join-
der as a major source of complexity.52 
Lon Fuller articulated a more focused view of complexity in 
the courts due to the number of parties or, more generally, the 
number of interacting "forces."53 He argued that courts only 
deal well with bipolar conflicts. Courts are not equipped to 
handle "polycentric" policy disputes that involve multiple inter-
ests. 54 While this article will not further discuss other issues 
of litigation complexity, Part VI.B does apply CCT to provide a 
theoretical foundation buttressing Fuller's perceptive insights. 
C. Normative Analyses of Complexity 
While The Manual offers a battery of tools and tricks for 
coping with involved cases, it offers no systematic theory for 
weighing the costs of complexity against its benefits (if any). 
While no other w()rks fill in this gap for litigation complexity, a 
number of scholars, applying law and economics, have devel-
oped cost-benefit analyses of the complexity of individual legal 
rules. 
Not all authors in this area would necessarily agree that 
capability to understand" either the facts or how the law applies to them. 
ld. at 1766. In the cognitive vein, he also notes that the "factfinder's life 
experiences may be so foreign to the key issues in the case that the 
factfinder cannot make the factual or legal inferences required by the 
case." ld. at 1766. 
50. THE MANuAL, supra note 44, § 10.1. 
51. ld. § 33.2. 
52. See Tidmarsh, supra note 45, at 1714 (advocating the court's role 
in denying joinder to avoid complexity). 
53. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 394-99 (arguing that polycentric dis-
putes, involving multiple parties, cannot effectively be adjudicated by a 
judge acting in his traditional role). 
54. See id. 
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they are analyzing complexity. The seminal work in this area 
considered "the benefits and costs associated with different 
choices along the continuum between the highly specific rule 
and the highly general standard .... "55 The authors label 
this "precision," and carefully note that length of a rule may be 
a poor proxy for it: 
Theoretically, the precision of a given law can be measured 
by the number of elementary situations or circumstances that 
are identified by that law to be either included in or excluded 
from the universe of circumstances to which a sanction ap· 
plies. Thus, precision refers to the information content of a · 
law rather than to the number of provisions included in a 
given law .156 
A more recent work applies the label "complexity" to what 
sounds like the same concept: "the complexity of legal rules 
refers to the number and difficulty of distinctions· the rules 
make . . . the more difficult it is to determine the applicable 
category-whether the difficulty involves understanding the . 
rules themselves or ascertaining the relevant facts-the 
greater complexity is said to be."57 
Dean Diver's work,58 avowedly a discussion of precision,59 
advances the analysis, suggesting that there is significant 
overlap between these economic studies and complexity as 
viewed by the authors previously discussed.60 He breaks preci-
sion down into three components: 
( 1) transparency: "use words with well-defined and universal-
ly accepted meanings"; 
(2) accessibility: "applicable to concrete situations without 
excessive difficulty or effort"; and 
55. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 261 (1974). 
56. ld. at 281. 
57. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150 (1994). 
58. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65 (1983). 
59. See id. at 66 ("Before we can begin to make useful prescriptions 
about the precision of administrative rules, we must give the concept . 
some added precision of its own."). 
60. See discussions supra Part II.A, II.B. 
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(3) congruence: "whether the substantive content of the mes-
sage communicated in his words produces the desired behav-
ior."61 
While congruence does not fit neatly into the factors contribut-
ing to legal complexity discussed above, transparency and 
accessibility seem to involve real-world complexity and cogni-
tive difficulties.62 
Cognitive difficulties, at bottom, explain the costs of preci-
sion/complexity described by these authors. Posner and Ehrlich 
focus on the expense of formulating rules that must categorize 
diverse behavior precisely, and note that such rules may re-
quire citizens to hire (expensive) experts (e.g., tax lawyers) to 
help them avoid liability.63 Building on the latter point, 
Kaplow emphasizes the costs of determining the application of 
more complex rules, and notes that to the extent people decide 
the costs -exceed the benefits, the rules will not alter behav-
ior.64 
While most of the literature summarized above focuses only 
on the costs of legal complexity,65 one of the m~or contribu-
tions of the economic approach is to shed light on the potential 
offsetting benefits. Posner and Ehrlich divide these benefits 
into two categories. First, and. perhaps of greater potential 
importance, 
[a] perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of rules brings 
society nearer to its desired allocation of resources by dis-
couraging socially undesirable activities and enco~raging 
socially desirable ones. This is because detailing the law 
efficiently ... results in an increase in the expected gains 
from engaging in socially desirable activity relative to that 
from engaging in undesirable activity.66 
61. Diver, supra note 58, at 67. 
62. See id. 
63. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 267-71. 
64. See Kaplow, Horizontal Equity, supra note 20, at 151, 153-55 
(stating that if the cost of complying with the rule is prohibitive, the 
rule will simply be ignored). 
65. Schuck's work is an exception; he explicitly analyzes legal com-
plexity in terms of its costs versus its benefits. See Schuck, supra note 8, 
at 7. Schuck focuses on sociological factors that may produce inefficiently 
complex laws. See id. 
66. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 262. The adverb "efficiently" 
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For example, vague laws on libel may chill socially desirable 
speech; the costs of complexity in cases like this seem to be 
outweighed by the benefits of greater specificity. To. the extent 
more detailed (complex) rules enable society to alter behavior 
in socially beneficial ways, complexity, far from evil, is posi-
tively desirable. 
Second, Ehrlich and Posner argue that precision yields a 
number of benefits within the legal system. Greater detail will 
produce fewer violations of the law (those due to uncertainty); 
prosecutors can deploy resources in a more focused way (more 
efficiently); greater predictability will encourage settlement;67 
and information about disputes will be cheaper to gather and 
communicate given the tight focus provided by detailed 
laws.68 
Once lawmakers list all the relevant costs and benefits of 
complexity, optimizing the amount of complexity in the law 
becomes a straightforward exercise in economic marginalism. 
One continues to add incremental precision to a rule as long as 
the sum of the benefits of the new twist exceed the sum of its 
costs. As in most areas, outlining this law and economics theo-
ry is much easier than applying it in the real world (where 
is important here; it means that the drafter makes no errors that inad-
vertently deter desirable conduct or fail to deter undesirable conduct. See 
id. at 268-70. 
67. See RICHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th 
ed. 1992) (arguing that if litigants can easily quantify the respective 
probability of winning in litigation [as a result of more predictable legis-
lation], he or she can more easily quantify his or her gain or loss as a 
result of litigation and are more likely to settle as a result). 
68. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 264-67. Those factors 
listed in the text do not exhaust the authors' discussion. Diver conscious-
ly follows Ehrlich & Posner's cost-benefit analysis. See Diver, supra note 
58, at 73-74 & n.36. While Kaplow extends their analysis significantly on 
the cost side from formulation to application of legal rules, he does not 
extend their analysis of the benefits of complexity. See Kaplow, supra 
note 57, at 150. In another article, Kaplow further departs from the 
Ehrlich & Posner approach by emphasizing that, in addition to level of 
detail, a major difference between general standards and specific rules is 
that rules decide most cases ex ante, while standards postpone decisions 
until actually presented in litigation. Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Stan-
dards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
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lawmakers must obtain accurate estimates of the abstract 
costs and benefits delineated in the literature). That said, this 
approach does seem to provide a useful framework for thinking 
about the complexity of specific legal rules and groups of 
rules.69 
Richard Epstein has taken this normative perspective to its 
limit, defining legal complexity in terms of the cost of obedi-
ence. "[T]he cheaper the cost of compliance, the simpler we can 
say the rule is .... '"0 To illustrate, he notes that while most 
lawyers (and especially law students) think the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is among the most complex of rules, they and 
their clients can avoid its pitfalls by adding a simple savings 
clause specifying how to distribute assets if the rest of the 
instrument contains a perpetuities violation. In contrast, the 
tax laws pose true, unavoidable complexity since there is no 
such "escape hatch." Based on these insights, Epstein argues 
that "the minimum condition for calling any rule complex is 
that it creates public regulatory obstacles to the achievment of 
some private objective.'m 
Epstein realizes that complex rules may yield the benefits 
discussed earlier in this section: better incentives for aligning 
narrow private incentives with the wider public good. Given a 
perceived present-day "bias toward overregulation," however, 
Epstein believes that "the presumption should be set in favor 
of a simplification of legal rules.'m 
Applying this normative framework, Epstein categorically 
rejects the notion discussed above,73 that an increasingly com-
plex world requires increasingly complex tax laws. "As a nor-
mative matter, the conventional view of the subject has mat-
ters exactly backward. The proper response to more complex 
societies should be an ever greater reliance on simple legal 
69. For a recent and somewhat quirky and informal examination of 
this topic by a prominent economist who cites none of the literature dis-
cussed in this section, see Gordon Tullock, On the Desirable Degree of 
Detail in the Law, 2 EUR. J.L. & EcoN. 199 (1995). 
70. RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 
25 (1995). 
71. Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). 
72. Id. at 36. 
73. See discussion supra Part II.A.l. 
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rules .... "74 Laws everywhere must deal with the same prob-
lems, scarcity of resources and human selfishness, and the 
complexity of society does not alter the best solutions, which 
Epstein argues remain simple rules. 
This same scarcity of resources, combined with the straight-
forward observation that, like any other good in a world of 
scarcity, "justice is subject to the law of diminishing return,"75 
leads Epstein to caution against investing excessive resources 
in the complex, multifaceted notions of justice, previously dis-
cussed.76 He pragmatically warns against aiming for 
unachievable perfection: 
The only question for the legal system is how it will make its 
errors, not whether it will make them. Simple rules are 
adopted by people who acknowledge that possibility up front, 
and then seek to minimize it in practice. Complex rules are 
for those who have an unattainable vision of perfection. 77 
D. How Computational Complexity Theory Differs from 
These Approaches: An Overview 
Epstein then addresses complexity in the large, analyzing its 
society-wide impact. ''Legal complexity is not merely a measure 
of the inherent or formal properties of legal rules. It is also a 
function of how deeply they cut into the fabric of ordinary 
life."78 Epstein examines specific rules (such as the Rule 
Against Perpetuities) to gauge their costs and benefits, and 
implicitly, like the law and economics approach summarized in 
the preceding section, studies costs and benefits as the com-
plexity I precision of rules increases. CCT concentrates on a 
different dimension of complexity. CCT takes the rules as 
fiXed, and analyzes the difficulty of applying them as the size of 
the case to which they must be applied increases. To take an 
example from a topic we shall later discuss at length,79 priori-
74. EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 21. 
75. ld. at 38. 
76. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
77. EPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 39. 
78. ld. at 29. 
79. See discussion infra Part IV .A.l. 
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ties among creditors, the law and economics approach80 would 
ask, "What are the costs and benefits of adding a rule to deal 
with cases of circular priorities?" This paper, applying CCT, 
instead asks, "How much more difficult is it to detect and deal 
with circular priorities when the number of creditors increases 
from 3 to 10? to 25? to 100?" 
While no previous work has explicitly weighed the difficulty 
of applying rules in the face of larger and larger cases, such 
questions seem just as important in practice as the costs and 
benefits of adding precision to existing rules. Moreover, while 
the costs and benefits in law and economics analysis are virtu-
ally impossible to gauge in practice, CCT provides precise mea-
surements of complexity. Admittedly, CCT achieves this preci-
sion by considering solely what Epstein labels the "formal 
properties of legal rules," and cannot address "how deeply 
[rules] cut into the fabric of ordinary life" across as broad a 
swath of issues as his and others' analyses. To reiterate, CCT 
sacrifices breadth for depth in understanding one type of legal 
complexity. 
It is easy to underestimate how quickly the size of a problem 
can make a set of rules practically useless. Although this arti-
cle explains the problem in detail,81 note for now that simply 
because a jury or a computer can solve a problem involving 
three creditors in three minutes in no way implies that they 
can solve a 100-creditor problem in 100 minutes. CCT shows 
that, depending on the rules, it may take more or less 
time-sometimes as much time as has elapsed since the birth 
of our universe in the Big Bang. 82 
It is also quite difficult for laymen (and often experts) to 
spot those sets of rules for which time requirements increase 
rapidly with the size of the problem. Consider a collection of 
cities, with some pairs connected directly by a road, while 
other pairs require travel through at least one other city. It is 
relatively easy to find a path that traverses each stretch of 
road exactly once, or to show that no such path exists, even as 
the number of cities and roads increases to very high numbers. 
80. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
81. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
82. See DAVID HAREL, ALGORITHMICS 156 fig.7.3 (2d ed. 1992) ("the 
number of microseconds since the 'Big Bang' has 24 digits"). 
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On the other hand, finding a path that visits each city exactly 
once quickly becomes infeasible as the number of cities inM 
creases above about twenty.83 
All the results of CCT hold for computers as well as humans. 
While many people believe that computers can perform any 
mechanical calculations relatively quickly, the main result of 
CCT is that for some problems this is not true. The fact that 
CCT applies to computers as well as humans tells us that it 
reveals a type of complexity that has nothing to do with cogni-
tive difficulties.84 Computers have no difficulty dealing with 
the intricate rules that may be difficult for humans. As Rook 
has noted, multi-level exceptions within exceptions are trivial 
for computers, as are cross-references between rules.85 It is 
true that computers generally cannot deal with verbal or 
written representations of mathematical relationships, but 
once such problems are "translated" into computer programs 
(their native tongue), computers are right at home with math 
problems. 
CCT does address the complexity of the real world and of 
complex notions of justice. To the extent that complexity in the 
real world translates into bigger problems, to which rules must 
be applied in court (e.g., greater number of creditors), CCT 
helps us gauge precisely how quickly complexity will over-
whelm factfinders. To the extent that multifaceted notions of 
justice lead us to draft involved rules, CCT tells us when our 
desire for justice crosses the threshold from practicality to 
impracticality. 
In addition to "narrow" applications that show when particu-
83. See id., at 128. For illustrations of how quickly this task becomes 
unmanageable, see infra Part III.E. CCT's version of complexity, as these 
simply-stated examples show, has nothing to do with the length of a law. 
Ehrlich and Posner disavow length as a proxy for complexity, but they 
appeal to an ill-defined tenn, "information content," which for decently 
drafted laws (those without meaningless clauses) would seem highly cor-
related with length. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 55, at 281. Other 
legal complexity scholars have recognized that at least some fonns of 
complexity have nothing to do with the length of a law. See Miller, su-
pra note 10, at 7 ("[e)ven a complex thought can sometimes be stated 
briefly."). 
84. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
85. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
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lar legal rules are unworkable for cases of significant size, CCT 
provides insights into more general issues of what is legally 
complex and why. Mter explaining CCT and using it to show 
that some existing legal rules are indeed impractical in bigger 
cases, the article will conclude by examining these broader 
applications. 
Ill. A PRIMER ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY THEORY (OR, 
THE LAWS OF COMPLEXITY) 
Users of computer programs require two things: that pro-
grams give correct answers (i.e., do what they claim to do), and 
that the programs yield such correct answers in a reasonable 
amount of time. The first requirement is undoubtedly more 
important, since an incorrect answer is worth little, if any-
thing, no matter how fast a computer produces it. Unfortunate-
ly, theorists have been able to provide only minimal assistance 
to programmers who wish to prove, as a matter of logical cer-
tainty, the c9rrectness of their software.86 
Theorists have, however, developed a substantial body of 
results to help programmers both to specifically gauge the time 
it will take their programs to run, and more generally to assist 
them in writing programs that run efficiently. This body of 
knowledge is CCT. Its main aims are (i) to assess how quickly 
programs will run, and (ii) to prove that a given approach is 
the fastest way to attack a problem. The following section pro-
vides readers with enough background in CCT to understand 
its relevance to legal rules. 
A. Truly Impossible Tasks (meta-tasks, in a sense) 
Before analyzing the complexity of a task and programs that 
solve it, theorists have another important contribution to offer: 
certain tasks are provably impossible. These tasks fall outside 
the ambit of complexity theory, into another computer science 
subfield called the theory of computation. Perhaps the most 
famous result of the theory of computation is that it is impossi-
86. See, e.g., NISSIM FRANCEZ, PROGRAM VERIFICATION (1992); JACQUES 
LoECKX & KURT SIEBER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PRoGRAM VERIFICATION 
(2d ed. 1987). 
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ble to write a computer program that takes any and all other 
computer programs as input and determines whether or not 
they will halt on any possible input.87 This would be an in-
credibly useful program, since, with such a tool, programmers 
could insure that their programs would never go into infmite 
loops (i.e., word processors would never get ''hung'' and become 
unresponsive to any user input). While it might be possible to 
construct a program that would detect the possibility of failure 
to halt in "most" cases, it is impossible to predict the cases for 
which this programmer's assistant would fail. Theorists have 
thus saved programmers the wasted effort of trying to con-
struct the unconstructable. Computer programmers of course 
strive continuously to write programs that will not "hang," and 
there are tools that help them detect some such cases. In the 
end, however, there is no general-purpose way to eliminate the 
possibility of programs running forever on some input. · 
. The theory of computation does have some lessons for legal 
theorists and legislators. Analogize a society's entire set of 
legal rules to one big computer program, and the facts of a 
particular case to a program's input. If a legal system permits 
rules to make reference to other rules and contains conditional 
statements (if x do A, otherwise do B), we have the possibility 
of precisely the kind of conditional ''jumps" in "control" that 
can lead a computer program to cycle endlessly (hang). Our 
statutes are filled with such cross-references and conditionals, 
and it is possible that buried in the statute books is a cycle of 
87. For an elementary and lucid proof of this important result, see 
HAREL, supra note 82, at 206-09. The idea of a computer program that 
takes other computer programs as input may strike the non-expert as 
bizarre. Such programs are, however, common and are increasingly im-
portant in modern software development. Programmers use "debuggers" to 
help find out where their programs produce errors, and they use perfor-
mance analyzers to detect where the program spends the most time. 
Even more important are the compilers that translate computer languag-
es in which humans can efficiently write computer programs (e.g., BA-
SIC, .Fortran, C ) into the 1's and O's that microprocessors can deal with; 
compilers are themselves programs that take as their only input other 
programs. See THEODORE GYLE & J.W. DOERR, MINICOMPUTERS STRUC-
TURE & PROGRAMMING 180-81 (1976) (defining "computer fundamental 
#4," which states that compilers accelerate the programming steps needed 
to design and implement programs). 
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references such that, when applied to some fact pattern (in-
put), leads lawyers through an endless, repetitious circuit of 
rules. The theory of computation tells us that it is futile to 
attempt to create an automatic procedure to detect such an 
unseemly possibility that will work in every case. The cost of 
such certainty would be to sacrifice cross-referencing, a cost we 
have apparently decided is not worth paying, perhaps under 
the belief that such an endless cycle of cross-references is high-
ly unlikely. 88 
B. Classifying the Complexity of Possible Tasks 
The remainder of this article assumes that the tasks facing 
programmers (and later, judges) are feasible; and focuses on 
the question of how long it takes proposed solutions to perform 
them. Just as legislators and judges do not craft different rules 
for different sized cases (e.g., the· rules for resolving priorities 
among creditors apply whether there are three or three hun-
dred of them), so too computer programmers do not write dif-
ferent programs to, e.g., sort lists of ten names and lists of 100 
names. In both cases, authors create solutions that can take 
input varying in size from nothing to instances of arbitrarily 
large size. 
In the realm of computers, theorists estimate the running 
time of a program by considering the number of elementary 
steps (e.g., discrete actions by the central processor) needed to 
solve a problem. As previously touched upon,89 the time it 
takes to complete a task, i.e., the number of elementary steps, 
of course depends on the .size of the input-basically, the size 
of the specific instance to which the program is being applied. 
A couple of examples familiar to many lawyers should help 
clarify this point. First, the amount of time it takes to find all 
cases that contain a word or phrase on LEXIS or Westlaw90 
88. For the application of some close relatives of the theory of compu-
tation to jurisprudential questions, see generally John M. Farago, Intrac-
table Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of the Law, 55 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 195 (1980); John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some 
Lessons About the Law from SelfReferential Problems in Mathematics, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992). 
89. See supra Part II.D. 
90. LEXIS is a trademark of the Reed Elsevier Pic Group; Westlaw is 
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depends on the size of the database being searched. 91 It will 
take longer to search for all cases from every American court 
that has ever used the phrase "circular priorities" than it will 
to search for the same phrase in only North Dakota cases de-
cided in the last five years. There is much more ground to 
cover in the first instance, and the computer will have to 
march through many more elementary operations .<such as 
comparing text, character by character). This translates into a 
longer running time. 
Another example that will be familiar to lawyers who use 
word processors is construction of a table of authorities at the 
beginning of a brief. The longer the brief, and the greater the 
number of citations, the longer it will take a computer to pro-
cess all the relevant information and spit out the table. 
CCT formalizes these insights to produce quantifiable mea~ 
sures of how long a program will take to process input of vari-
ous sizes. One way to present such information is in a table. 
For instance, LEXIS or Westlaw might provide customers with 
the following summary: · 
Number of Cases Being Time to Complete 





This provides a rough idea of the relationship between the size 
of the problem and the time it will take to do it, but such a 
table is incomplete. Users might ask about the time necessary 
a trademark of West Publishing Corporation. 
91. To be technically precise, the size of the word or phrase a user is 
searching for also affects the time (number of steps) a search takes, but 
this is a minor factor compared to the size of the database being 
searched. See, e.g., GYLE & DoERR, supra note 87, at 220-21 (explaining 
that the average time of a database search is directly proportional to the 
length of the database). For further discussion about database searches, 
see id. at 210-36. 
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if there are seven cases, or seventeen, or 17 million. We could 
build a huge table with every number from one to the total 
number of cases in existence, but that is unmanageable. There 
is a better way. 
CCT describes the time it takes to perform a task as a func-
tion of the size of the input. These are the same functions that 
algebra teachers have tortured high school students with for 
years. Putting the table above into functional form, we have 
one example of a time complexity function: 
Time-1 = 10 x (#of cases)+ 1 
Users now have no need for a gargantuan table; they can take 
the number of cases they need to search, plug it into this func-
tion, and directly obtain the time their search will take. 
The casual observer may focus on the two numbers in the 
function, 10 and 1, in assessing the general performance of the 
search program. In CCT, however, these numbers (the first is 
called a coefficient, the second a constant) are of little conse-
quence. This is easiest to understand for constants like the "1" 
at the end of the function. Since it makes an absolutely fixed 
contribution to the time the program takes, no matter how 
many cases the program searches, its contribution to the total 
time (in percentage terms) becomes minuscule rather quickly. 
This is somewhat analogous to the observation that fixed co~ts 
do not affect economic decisions at the margin. . 
Understanding why coefficients (like the "10" in the function 
Time-1) do not matter takes a bit more thought. After all, since 
this factor significantly increases the running time as the num-
ber of cases grows, it would seem to be crucial to CCT. To see 
why such coefficients are relatively unimportant in measuring 
the growth rate of our Time function, consider a proposed new 
program to search through cases. After examining it, we deter-
mine that its running time function, Time-2, is defined as 
follows: 
Time-2 = .002 x (#of cases) x (#of cases) 
This new program's time function has a much smaller coeffi-
cient (5000 times smaller) than Time-1, and it has no constant 
factor at all. There is, however, the somewhat troubling cir-
cumstance that the function multiplies the number of cases by 
itself. Rewriting Time-2 in more compact notation, we express 
this self-product with an exponent: 
Time-2 = .002 x (#of cases)2 
1997] COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY THEORY 429 
We are interested in comparing how fast Time-1 and Time-2 
increase as the number of cases increases-i.e., the growth 
rate of the time functions. Let's build a table to compare the 
growth rates of Ti.me-1, with its higher coefficient (and con-
stant), and Time-2 (with its squared term). In addition to cal-
culating both run times, the table includes a final column ex-
pressing Time-2 as a percentage ofTime-1. 
Number of Time-1 Com- Time-2 Com- Time-2 
Cases Being pletion pletion as% of 
Searched Time-1 
100 1,001 20 2% 
1,000 10,001 2,000 20% 
-10,000 100,001 200,000 200% 
100,000 1,000,001 20,000,000 2000% 
While the lower coefficient (and, to a much smaller extent, 
the lack of a constant term) cause Time-2 to have a faster 
running time for searches involving up to 1000 cases, some-
where in the interval between 1,000 and 10,000 cases Time-1 
becomes clearly preferable. Moreover, in percentage terms 
Time-l's advantage increases as the number of cases increases. 
This example shows that, in analyzing the growth rate of func-
tions, exponents on the variable(s) (here, the single variable is 
the number of cases) are the determinative factor "in the long 
run." The effect of such self-multiplication of the variable, here 
the number of cases, overpowers constants and coefficients. 
Specifically, this example shows that a quadratic function (like 
Time-2, with a variable squared) will eventually exceed a lin-
ear function (like Time-1, with no exponents on the vari-
ables).92 
92. The relative unimportance of coefficients and constants answers 
questions that may have occurred to . some readers. Does the running 
time of a program depend on the specific computer it is running on? 
Does this make it impossible to discuss running time in general? The an-
swer to the first question is "yes." The difference in running time be· 
tween computers can vary by a factor of ten, a thousand, a million, or 
even more. Note, however, that whatever the difference, it is a fixed 
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Comparisons between functions like Time-1 and Time-2 are 
the essence of CCT. If given the choice between a linear and a 
quadratic program that perform the same task, CCT says that, 
in general, the linear program is preferable since it will do the 
job in less time. 93 Roughly speaking, CCT views all linear pro-
grams that solve the same problem as "equals," or more pre-
cisely, as members of the same complexity class (all quadratic 
functions are members of a less preferable class). That is not to 
say that all linear running time solutions to the same problem 
are equal; lower coefficients lead to quicker performance and 
so are, of course, preferred. The percentage difference between 
two linear programs, however, does not change with the size of 
the input. Unlike the quadratic example, Time-2, users do not 
pay an ever-increasing penalty (in percent terms), as the size 
of the input increases, when using an inferior linear-program. 
Since Time-1 is preferable to Time-2, should programmers 
stop there, or should they look for an even better solution? 
This brings us to the second m~or goal of CCT: helping pro-
grammers determine the fastest possible way to solve a prob-
lem. In technical terms, this is called establishing a lower 
bound on the complexity class of a problem. For instance, it is 
impossible to search cases for a word in less than linear time. 
To see why this is true, note that any faster algorithm must 
necessarily fail to examine at least some words, for any algo-
rithm that examines each word is by definition linear (under 
the assumption that examining a word takes a fixed number of 
elementary steps). Establishing lower bounds for problems is 
more difficult than assessing the complexity of a given pro-
gram, but it is no less important. 
multiple. All programs, roughly speaking, will run a fixed percent faster 
on one machine than on any given slower machine. Since coefficients are 
irrelevant to CCT, the theory applies across all computers. A program 
that is linear on IBM's first PC is linear on the fastest supercomputer 
today. It will run much faster on the latter, but · the advantage of the 
supercomputer, again, in percent terms, will not increase as the size of 
the input grows. 
93. It is possible to imagine situations where this is not true. If (i) 
the coefficient (and the constant) in a quadratic function are much small-
er, and (ii) it is known that the size of the input will never be very 
large, then a quadratic running time program will be preferable to a 
linear one. Such examples, however, are rare in practice. 
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C. The Line Between Tractable and Intractable Problems: 
Exponentials v. Polynomials 
In most cases, a linear algorithm is the best we can hope for. 
Finding a linear procedure is very good news to computer sci-
entists.94 We saw in the previous section that the running 
time of quadratic programs (those with an exponent of two on 
a variable) are usually longer. The difference gets worse as the 
exponent of the variable increases; thus cubic programs (expo-
nent of three) take longer than quartic programs, and quartic 
programs (exponent of four) take longer still. 
Now add a strange twist: programs whose time complexity 
function has the input size variable as an exponent. For in-
stance, we can imagine a case searching algorithm with the 
following running time function: 
Time-3 = 2<' of words) 
One way to think of such functions, aptly called exponentials, 
is as weird polynomials where the degree of the polynomial 
increases with the size of the variable. Thus, for instance, this 
exponential searching algorithm looks like a quadratic function 
for documents with two words, a cubic function for documents 
94. One exception of a program that runs even faster than linear is a 
a search of a sorted list to see if the given entry is contained. By first 
examining the middle item, and then comparing it to the item the user 
is searching for and concentrating on that half of the list where the 
entry may lie, a program can find any entry in much fewer guesses than 
the total number of items in the list. Specifically, such a program can 
locate an item (or show its absence) in, at most, the logarithm of the 
number of entries. For example, we can find an entry in a list of 10 in 
at most four guesses, an entry in a list of 100 in at most eight guesses, 
and an entry in a list of 1000 in at most 12 guesses. See GYLE & 
DOERR, supra note 87, at 224 (explaining the mathematical basis for the 
search algorithm). 
It is also possible to obtain what appears to be faster than linear 
programs by precomputing part of the solution before users run a pro-
gram. For instance, both LEXIS and Westlaw compile indexes of almost 
all of the words in their databases so that when users perform a search, 
the program looks in a sorted list to see if a case has a given word, 
instead of marching through the (unsorted) case itself. Electronic Mail 
from John P. Hourigan, Lexis-Nexis Corporation, to the author (July 18, 
1996). The reason this is not really better than linear, for the purposes 
of CCT, is that assembling the indexes in the first place takes more than 
linear time. 
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with three words, and so on. 
The growth rate of exponential functions is striking.95 The 
following tables help illustrate the difference between linear, 
various polynomial, and various exponential running times.96 
N (Think of N as number of words to be searched) 
Func- 10 50 100 300 1000 
tion 
5N 50 250 500 1500 5000 
N2 100 2500 10,000 90,000 1 X 106 
N3 1000 1.25x105 1 X 106 27 X 106 1 X 1010 
2N 1024 1 X 1016 1 X 1031 1 X 1091 1 X 10302 
NN 1 X 1010 1 X 1085 1 X 10201 1 X 10744 unimag-
inably 
large 
Perhaps surprisingly, most programs with polynomial time 
complexity functions run fast enough that they can work in 
95. Some lawyers have long been aware of this fact. See Armstrong v. 
M'Ghee 1795 Add. 261 (County Ct. Westmoreland, Pa., 1975) (attorney 
arguing that a contract that called for a price as "a barley corn for the 
first nail, in his shoes, and so in a duplicate ratio for every other," 
would not be "fair [or] reasonable"). By "duplicate ratio," I believe the 
lawyer meant that the number of grains would double with each nail. 
This is an example of an exponentially growing quantity. 
At times legal scholars have blurred the important distinction be-
tween polynomials and exponentials. See POSNER, supra note 67, at 51 
(noting that "generally the costs of a transaction rise with the number of 
parties to the transaction-perhaps exponentially. The formula for the 
number of links required to join all members of a set of n members is 
suggestive in this connection: n(n-1)/2."). Id. The formula, however, is 
quadratic (2nd order polynomial), not exponential. As discussed infra Part 
IV.B, the quantity that grows exponentially with the number of parties· is 
the number of possible coalitions (of varying size) that the individuals 
might form.). 
96. liAREL, supra note 82, at 166 Fig. 7.3. 
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practice even on problems of relatively large size.97 Exponen-
tial functions, however, are on the other side of the divide. The 
rate of increase is out of control. When the amount of time it 
takes to solve a task grows exponentially with the size of the 
input, we say that the task is intractable-it is solvable in 
theory, but would take an eternity for problems of even modest 
size, as the table above illustrates. 
[E]xponential algorithms should not be considered 'good' 
algorithms, and indeed this usually is the case. Most expo-
nential algorithms are merely variations on exhaustive 
search, whereas polynomial time algorithms generally are 
made possible only through the gain of some deeper insight 
into the structure of the problem. There is wide agreement 
that a problem has not been 'well-solved' until a polynomial 
time algorithm is known for it. Hence, we shall refer to a 
problem as intractable if it is so hard that no polynomial 
time algorithm can possibly solve it.98 
The line separating polynomials from exponentials is the line 
97. This is true in practice because most programs that run in polyno-
mial time are of relatively low degree, typically quadratic or cubic. A 
program with a running time function of degree, ten thousand, admit-
tedly, would not be very useful. It would be worse than an: exponential · 
running time program for all problems of size up to (roughly) ten thou-
sand. 
98. MICHAEL R. GAREY & DAVID S. JOHNSON, COMPUTERS AND 
INTRACTABILITY 8 (1979). If the size of the problem is guaranteed to fall 
below a given level, say 10, then an exponential program might work 
faster than a polynomial of a degree higher than 10. Also, on rare occa-
sion a program that has an exponential running time ends up working 
well in practice. This illustrates a subtle but important aspect of CCT 
ignored in the text: most commonly, computer scientists use a worst-case 
analysis of a program's running time. It is possible for a program to 
work very quickly for most inputs, but very slowly on a small class of 
examples. Such examples, however, seem to be the exception rather than 
the rule. There are two additional reasons computer scientists use worst-
case analysis instead of a seemingly more appealing average-case analy-
sis. First, as a matter of mathematics, it is often difficult or impossible 
to calculate average-case running time. Second, worst-case calculations 
avoid surprises. They provide programmers with an absolute bound on 
the running time of their programs; users might be surprised by algo-
rithms with a good average-case running time, if they apply the program 
to a problem that takes much longer than average . 
.. 
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separating problems that can be solved by programs that run 
in a reasonable time from those that cannot. 99 
Note that even the now predictable leaps in computer perfor-
mance, with speeds doubling about every eighteen months/00 
are of only marginal help with problems that require exponen-
tial time. Such doubling of machine speed doubles the size of 
problems we can solve with linear programs. Even for a qua-
dratic running time program it increases the size of solvable 
problems by around forty percent. For exponential problems, 
doubling computer speeds increases the scale of solvable prob-
lems by only one unit. It takes a very long time, at that rate, 
to get to problems of serious size. 
D. Provably Intractable Tasks 
In order to understand what computer scientists mean when 
they state that "exponential algorithms should not be consid-
ered 'good' algorithms" because they "are merely variations on 
exhaustive search," consider the following legal variant of a 
well-known puzzle. The goal is to fit the nine squares together 
99. It is important to note that this distinction between polynomials 
and exponentials is not the relevant distinction in other contexts. For in· 
stance, Dean Clark argues persuasively that businesses organize hierar-
chically in order to limit the number of channels of communication, and 
the costs that such communication entails. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPO-
RATE LAW app. A, 801-16 (1986). In a completely democratic firm, on the 
other hand, where any employee could talk with any other employee, the 
costs of communication would undoubtedly be higher. See id. at 805-06. 
As a first estimate, however, the increase appears akin to that of moving 
from a linear program to a quadratic one in the following sense. In a 
strict hierarchy, each employee can only talk with one person "above" 
her, and so the number of possible communication links is equal to the 
number of employees (i.e., linear in the number of employees). See id. at 
807-08. Under complete democracy, the number of such links rises only 
to a function that is quadratic in the number of employees. See Kaplow, 
supra note 64. If Dean Clark is correct, a polynomial number of commu· 
nication links imposes inefficient costs, even before we contemplate an 
exponential number of such links. 
100. "Moore's Law (named after Intel cofounder Gordon Moore) . . . 
states that the number of transistors on a chip will double every 18 
months or so. Performance has increased at nearly the same rate." Mi-
chael J. Miller, Microprocessors March On, P.C. MAG., Dec. 17, 1996, at 
4. 
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into a three-by-three square so that all of the. internal edges 
match. It may help to motivate readers if they photocopy the 
page, cut out the pieces and try to solve the puzzle . 
... 
-
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Those who become frustrated have good company. There is a 
solution, but to date no one has produced a systematic way of 
finding it. The only sure way to solve it is to try every possible 
arrangement of the nine pieces. This is what is meant by "ex-
haustive search," and even for seemingly small problems it is 
exhausting. At first blush that may not sound onerous, but the 
number of possible arrangements for this innocuous-looking 
three-by-three puzzle is over 95 billion.101 Even for the trivi-
al-looking two-by-two version of the puzzle there are 6,144 
possible arrangements. For a four-by-four puzzle we again see 
the power of exponentiation: the number of arrangements goes 
from the billions to a 22-digit number, roughly equaling the 
number of microseconds (millionth of a second) since the Big 
Bang.to2 
It is easy to construct computer programs that take an expo-
nential amount of time. CCT is more concerned with identify-
ing those tasks that cannot be solved any more quickly; i.e., for 
what problems is an exponential running-time program the 
best possible solution? Such problems are intractable, as de-
fined above. 
The answer consists of good news and what all theorists 
suspect is bad news. First the good news: there are very few 
tasks that we know without a doubt take an exponential 
amount of time. The canonical example of a task that takes 
exponential time is listing all the subsets of a given set. This 
takes an exponential amount of time since the number of sub-
sets increases exponentially as we add elements to a set. 103 
101. This number is derived as follows. First, there are 9! (the "!" 
means factorial: 9! = 9x8x7x ... 1) ways to place the nine pieces (upper 
left, upper center, ... , lower right). Once we have placed them, there 
are four ways to rotate each piece, and this amounts to 48 total rotation-
al arrangements for each of the 9! placement patterns. Taking the prod-
uct, we have 
9! X 49 : 95,126,814,720 
potential solutions. 
102. See HAREL, supra note 82, at 166. Here are the calculations for 
the two-by-two and the four-by-four puzzles: 
2 by 2: 4! X 44 = 6144; 
4 by 4: 16! X 416 "" 8.986 X 10:l2 
(= means "approximately;" this number has been truncated). 
103. To take a concrete example of this type of task, consider in the 
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Most other examples are closely related to this task.104 
E. Probably Intractable Tasks 
The suspected bad news is that many common problems 
probably take an exponential amount of time to solve. These 
problems comprise a complexity class with the esoteric name of 
NP-complete ("NP-c"), 105 that has defied decades of efforts to 
fmd efficient (polynomial) solutions. They can all be solved in 
exponential time with exhaustive search but, as we have seen, 
that is really no solution at all. It has become a virtual holy 
grail of CCT to prove that these problems do indeed require an 
exponential number of steps-that this is the lower bound on 
the time required for any solution to them. This writer, like 
almost all computer scientists, works on the assumption that 
context of business organizations and lines of communication between 
employees, see Clark, supra note 99, and the number of subcommittees. 
If we define a subcommittee as any group of employees that share mutu-
al lines of communication (all have access to each other), then in the 
completely democratic firm the number of subcommittees grows exponen-
tially as the number of employees increases. In a hierarchical firm, on 
the other hand, the number of such committees grows in only a linear 
fashion. 
104. The number of moves required to solve some puzzles and to find a 
winning strategy to a number of well-known games turns out to increase 
exponentially as the size of the game increases. The Towers of Hanoi 
puzzle, for instance, requires players to move a set of disks of decreasing 
size from one pole to another with the use of a third pole for temporary 
storage. The rub is that players cannot place a larger disk on top of a 
smaller one. As the number of disks increases, the number of moves 
required to accomplish the task increases exponentially. See BAREL, supra 
note 82, at 161-62. While CCT does not apply to traditional chess since 
the game is of a fixed size, finding a guaranteed winning strategy for 
generalized chess, where the rules allow for the addition of pieces and in-
creases in the size of the board, takes an exponentially increasing 
amount of time. See Aviezri S. Fraenkel & David L. Lichtenstein, Com-
puting Perfect Strategy for nxn Chess Requires Time Exponential in n, 31 
J. COMBINATORIAL THEORY 199 (1981). 
105. This means "nondeterministic polynomial complete." Without get-
ting into technical details irrelevant for the purposes of this article, solu-
tions to all these problems can be verified in a polynomial number of 
steps. GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 28 ("It is this nation of 
polynomial time \rerifiability' that the class NP is intended to isolate."). 
Finding the solution in the first place, however, is the rub. 
438 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.49:403 
NP-c problems are computationally intractable. 
An incredibly broad range of problems have been proven to 
be in the NP-c category, and thus likely require exponential 
time to solve. 106 This article has already discussed one of the 
most famous examples:107 trying to fmd a path on a network 
of roads that starts and ends in a city and that passes through 
every other city exactly once. This problem, with intractable 
variants, comes up in a wide variety of contexts, from estab-
lishing· airline schedules to routing telephone calls. It is quite 
easy for computers (and humans) to solve examples with five 
or six cities. 
Figure I 
One solution to this simple example is A, B, D, C, E, A. The 
problem becomes difficult when the number of cities reaches 
ten. 
106. ·See GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, ~pp. 
107. See supra Part II.D. 
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Figure 2 
One solution to this example is A, F, B, H, G, I, C, E, D, J, A. 
When the number of cities reaches ~wenty, the problem be-
comes intractable. 108 
108. See GARI':Y & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 199. 
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Figure 3 
The author does not know if there is a solution; such examples 
are much easier to create than to solve. Such networks (or 
graphs), involving vertices (cities) and edges (roads), are a rich 
source of NP-c problems. 109 
Here is another colorful example. Given a knapsack of fixed 
volume and a collection of objects with fixed volume and worth~ 
109. See id. at 190-220. 
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maximize the value placed in the sack. 110 Again, when the 
number of objects is relatively small, computers and humans 
can find the solution easily. 
Knapsack Volume: 20 
Item# Volume Value 
1 10 50 
2 8 40 
3 7 35 
4 6 27 
5 5 24 
6 4 20 
As the size of the problem becomes even modestly large, find-
ing a solution is extremely difficulty. 
Knapsack Volume: 20 
Item# Volume Value 
1 20 60 
2 19 55 
3 18 54 
4 17 51 
5 12 39 
6 11 35 
7 10 29 
8 9 25 
9 5 14 
10 4 12 
11 3 10 
12 2 8 
110. See id. at 247. 
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Part IV, infra, explores a number of additional examples of 
intractable problems. 
F. The Computer Science '~nswer": Heuristics 
When faced with intractable problems, programmers cannot 
simply throw their hands up. Airlines need schedules, phone 
companies need calls routed, and contractors need timetables. 
While programmers know that they cannot provide optimal 
solutions, they experiment with techniques to provide the best 
feasible solution.111 Programs that take this approach ("I 
know it's not the best answer, but it's the best I can do") are 
called heuristics. 
There are a number of tricks that may help programmers 
craft heuristics. If most or all examples faced in practice are 
some special case of the more general problem, it may turn out 
that the special case is tractable. Or, for some problems, a 
program may work quite well in practice despite the fact that 
there are a few examples that cause it to run for an inordi-
nately long time. 112 
In some cases, CCT can help programmers with theoretical 
results. For some NP-c problems, theorists can prove that a 
certain approach always comes within some predictable per-
centage of the optimal solution. The bad news continues, how-
ever. Other NP-c problems do not guarantee even approximate 
solutions.113 In general, coming up with heuristic solutions 
for NP-c problems is as much an art as it is a science. 
111. To be more precise, economics predicts that programmers will con-
tinue to look for better solutions as long as the marginal benefits, in 
terms of a better solution, exceed the marginal costs, i.e., programmer's 
time, computer resources, etc. 
112. For example, the simplex method for linear programming (optimiz-
ing a linear function subject to linear constraints), while having an expo-
nential worst-case running time, usually solves problems relatively quick-
ly-indeed more quickly than the first polynomial method discovered. See 
HAREL, supm note 82, at 188. A subsequent polynomial method, however, 
has proved markedly faster. See Neal Karmarkar, A New Polynomial-
Time Algorithm for Linear Programming, 4 COMBINATORICA 373 (1984). 
113. See HAREL, supm note 82, at 182-83. 
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G. Comparing Humans to Computers 
Before applying CCT to legal rules, readers may wonder 
what pertinence, if any, a defmition of complexity taken from 
computer science has for the law. In order to understand CCT's 
relevance to legal rules, it is useful to com pare and contrast 
the abilities of computers and humans. The following table 
lists representative tasks with which computers and humans 
have either an easy or a difficult time handling. 
COMPUTERS 
Easy Hard 
• simple arithmetic • recogndzing faces 
H Easy • philosophizing 
• creativity (legal, 
u artistic, ... ) 
M • involved arithmetic • intractable prob 
• exceptions within lems 
A exceptions with 
Hard in ... • searching 
N large amounts of 
text 
s 
We do not use computers for problems that humans find 
easy (nobody uses a calculator to add two plus two), but they 
have become indispensable for tasks involving huge amounts of 
arithmetic and more complex math. Computers crunch num-
bers much· more rapidly and accurately than humans. In the 
same vein, computers have made impracticable chores routine 
(e.g., searching 10,000 cases for the word "circular" within a 
thousand words of "path"). 
There remains, however, a large domain of problems for 
which human abilities far outstrip computers. Despite periodic 
hype from artificial intelligence experts, computers have shown 
no signs of creativity.114 Their ability to perform some seem-
114. See DEREK PARTRIDGE & JON RoWE, COMPUTERS AND CREATIVITY 
114 (1994). 
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ingly mechanical tasks, such as recognizing faces, while im-
proving, still lags far behind that of humans.m; 
This article focuses on the fmal category of intractable tasks 
that are difficult for both computers and humans. CCT embod-
ies a notion of complexity independent of both human cognitive 
weaknesses and raw computational power. While advances in 
education can reduce cognitive difficulties, and advances in 
computer technology can make some previously unsolvable 
problems manageable, intractable problems are stubbornly 
immune to such "attacks."116 Since such problems will never 
be fully solved, the law, like other disciplines, must decide how 
to deal with them when presented, or how to avoid facing them 
in the first place. 
What is potentially deceptive about these problems is that, 
to those unfamiliar with CCT, they sound like the kind of 
mechanical tasks for which computers can provide solutions 
when human capabilities become overwhelmed. This may lead 
lawmakers to adopt rules based on the false belief that com-
puters can help if a particular case becomes too involved. The 
next section shows that some existing rules contain the poten-
tial to unmask such wishful thinking. 
115. See generally MONIQUE PAVEL, FuNDAMENTALS OF PA'ITERN RECOG-
NITION (2d ed. rev. and expanded 1993). 
116. This is why Gann & Strowd's argument, that technology should 
offset the increasing complexity of the real world must be qualified. See 
GANN & STROWD, supra note 14, at 1711. To the extent a more compli-
cated world generates bigger problems that are NP-c, gains in technology 
(e.g., the speed of computers) are nowhere near enough to cope. See 
supra text accompanying note 14. 
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IV. ACTUAL CASES OF FACTUAIJ..Y INTRACTABLE TASKS IN THE 
COURTS 
A. Cycles, Cycles Everywhere 
Rules invariably attempt to reshape chaos into order, and 
one of the most natural ways of imposing order is an ordering 
of items. For example, land recording statutes attempt to place 
mortgages and other interests in order based on the time an 
interest holder records, and, at times, on knowledge of other 
(unrecorded) claims. UCC Article 9 aims to place secured per~ 
sonal property creditors within a similar framework.117 
As the subsections below show, however, sometimes a 
strange thing happens on the way to fonning well-ordered 
queues: a cycle occurs. Party A comes ahead of Party B; Party 
B comes ahead of Party C; and Party C comes ahead of Party 
A. Graphically: 
Figure 4 
This section will show the wide variety of ways in which this 
anomaly can arise. 
117. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1995); M. Stuart Sutherland, Note, Circular 
Priority Systems Within the Uniform Commercial Code, 61 TEx. L. R.EV. 
517, 518 (1982). 
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Courts and scholars have long118 recognized this possibility. 
The phenomenon has been almost universally lamented; typi-
cal are declarations that circular priorities are "insoluble on 
any known principles."119 Grant Gilmore wryly commented, 
"[a] judge who finds himself face to face with a circular priority 
system typically reacts in the manner of a bull who has been 
goaded by the picadors: he paws the ground and roars with 
rage. The spectator can only sympathize with judge and 
bull."I2o 
Circular priorities continue to pose, at a minimum, "a minor 
embarrassment" to legal rulemakers.121 Despite many efforts 
to deal with cycles, many quite subtle/22 there is still no uni-
form approach. "Any solution [to circular priority problems] 
may seem arbitrary and produce anomalous results."123 
No previous work, however, has focused on an even more 
difficult antecedent issue, that of detecting cycles in the first 
place. While parties and courts may stumble across them in 
particular cases, it turns out that, in general, systematically 
fmding cycles in relationships between a number of parties is 
NP-c.124 This means, to summarize the previous section, that 
as the number of parties in a case grows to even moderate size, 
the difficulty of dealing with cycles is dwarfed by the difficulty 
118. According to one author, the first circular priorities case is over 
three hundred years old. See Note, Circuity of Liens-A Proposed Solu· 
tion, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1938) (citing Greswold v. Marsham, 
22 Eng. Rep. 898 (Ch. 1685)). 
119. Andrus v. Burke, 48 A. 228, 229 (N.J. Eq. 1901). 
120. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
§ 39.1 at 1020-21 (1965). Gilmore remains the authoritative treatment on 
circular priorities. For an earlier version of substantially the same mate-
rial, see Grant Gilmore, Circular Priority Systems, 71 YALE L.J. 53 
(1961). 
121. See Michael D. White, Untangling Circular Priorities Under UCC 
Section 9·114, 86 CoM. L.J. 231, 233 (1981). 
122. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.2. 
123. In re Holly Knitwear, Inc., 356 A.2d 405, 409 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1976). 
124. See GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 213. To be precise, it 
has been shown that determining whether there is a cycle of a given size 
is an intractable task. See id. From this it follows that a number of 
related problems are also intractable: finding the longest cycle, as well as 
finding all cycles. 
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of detecting them in the first place. 
1. Circular Priorities Among Creditors and Claimants 
a. Subordination 
Consider a borrower who has granted a first mortgage on 
Blackacre to A, a second mortgage to B, and a third mortgage 
to C. In return for some valuable consideration, A then waives 
his priority over C in what is often called a subordination 
agreement. We now have the following set of priorities: 
C bargained for 
subordination of 
A's interest 




mortgage before 8 
Two of the three parties have, by agreement, created a circular 
system of priorities. If the borrower defaults, there is no order-
ing left to control payments to the three creditors. · 
In this case of circularity created by a subordination agree-
ment, at least, "[t]here is a comforting unanimity, among 
courts and commentators, on the proper distribution of the 
fund."125 Dubbed the subordination rule by Gilmore, it calls 
for payment according to the following rules: 
1. Set aside from the fund the amount of A's claim. 
125. 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.1, at 1020. 
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2. Pay the amount so set aside to 
a) C, to the amount of his claim; 
b) A, to the extent of any balance remaining ·after C's claim 
is satisfied. 
3. Pay B the amount of the fund remaining after Ns claim 
has been set aside. 
4. If any balance remains in the fund after Ns claim has 




This rule effectuates the intent of the agreement between A 
and C, without affecting the amount received by B (who is not 
a party to the subordination agreement).127 Nevertheless, 
courts continue to apply this rule to solve circular priorities 
created by subordination agreements.128 
126. ld. 
127. The solution is an illustration of the more general nemo dat qui 
non habet rule: "{h]e who hath not cannot give." BLACK's LAw DICTIO· 
NARY 1037 (6th ed. 1990). Applied to this example, A cannot give C what 
A does not have. In the context of this example, A can grant C priority 
over B only to the extent that A has such priority. 
128. See In re Cliff's Ridge Skiing Corp., 123 B.R. 753 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1991) (applying the subordination rule to determine priority of sale 
proceeds). For an unusual example, see United States v. Gila Valley 
Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Ariz. 1996). In this case, the Gila 
River Indian Community (GRIC) had prior appropriation rights for Gila 
River waters dating from time immemorial. The Apache Tribe had prior 
appropriation rights dating from 1846, held in trust for the tribe by the 
United States, and the Upper Valley Defendants (UVDs) had prior ap· 
propriation rights dating from 1872. Under the terms of a 1935 consent 
decree, however, the UVDs received apportionment rights that in some 
cases trumped the GRIC's priority. See United States v. Gila Valley Irri-
gation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court explic· 
itly found that there was a circular priority problem, see Gila Valley, 31 
F.3d at 1457, and followed the subordination rule laid' out. See supra 
Part IV.A1.a; Gila Valley, 31 F.3d at 1459·60. For a more complete his· 
tory of the case, see United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 454 
F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1972) and Gila Valley Irrigation Dist. v. United 
States, 118 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1941). 
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b. Recording Systems 
Because the circularity created by subordination agreements 
is consensual, it makes sense to resolve it based on the intent 
(and power) of the parties. Not all circular priority situations, 
however, are this simple. Almost any recording system, for 
instance, can give rise to circular priorities without :Bubordina· 
tion and without any other agreement among creditors. 
The basic idea of any recording system is that a creditor or 
claimant's place in line is based on the order of filing- first in 
time, first in right.129 Pure race systems, however, where 
time of filing is all that matters, are quite rare.13° For real 
property, most states use either a notice or a race/notice re-
cording system.131 The key notion in both is that of the Bona 
Fide Purchaser (BFP). A BFP is a buyer who (i) has no knowl· 
edge of any other unrecorded interests, and (ii) pays fair value. 
BFPs are deemed to be on notice of all recorded interests. 132 
In a notice system, the rule is that the latest BFP has the 
superior claim;133 in a race/notice system, the rule is that if 
there are ever multiple BFPs, the frrst of them to record has 
the superior claim.134 
Circularities can arise in both systems because creditors 
may know of earlier interests that have not yet been recorded. 
For example, assume A takes a first mortgage on Blackacre to 
secure a loan, but fails to file. B, with actual knowledge of A's 
interest, takes a second mortgage, and records. C, without any 
knowledge of A's unrecorded interest, takes a third mortgage 
and records. Under either a notice or a race/notice system, we 
then get the following example of a circular priority: 
129. See 6A RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. RoHAN, POWELL ON 
REAL PROPERTY § 82.01[1][a] (1996). 
130. Only North Carolina and Louisiana have pure race recording acts. 
See id. § 82.02[1J[c][i] n.8. Article 9 of the UCC creates a recording sys-
tem that is much closer to pure race than most real estate recording 
acts, but, as shown later in this section, even it has small exceptions 
that can lead to circular priorities. Note that in a truly pure race system 
circular priorities can arise only by subordination agreements. 
131. See 6A POWELL & RoHAN, supra note 129, at § 82.01[2][b]. 
132. See id. § 82.01[1][b]. 
133. See id. § 82.02 [1][c][ii]. 
134. See id. § 82.02[1][c][iii]. 
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C had no knowledge 
of A's unrecorded 
8 recorded before C 
Figure 6 
8 had actual 
knowledge of A's 
unrecorded interest 
Articulating a rule to break this cycle seems more difficult 
than in the case of the subordination agreement, since no par-
ty assented to its creation. Arguably, however, A is "at fault" in 
the sense that she could have avoided this mess most easily (at 
least cost). The recording act focuses attention on this nonfea-
sance, even if it does not clearly make A liable. Thus, the ma-
jority of courts have applied the subordination rule against A 
in this case as well. B gets paid firSt, then C, and A is last in 
line. 135 The modern trend continues in this direction. 136 
While no circular priority cases under Uniform Commercial 
Code recording systems137 have yet been litigated, 138 schol-
ars have found that the Code contains a nurn her of rules that 
can give rise to such difficulties. This article briefly explains 
two examples, to give readers a flavor for circular priorities 
135. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.4. 
136. See Pulawski Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Aguiar, 415 A.2d 365 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (rejecting another approach and adopting sub-
ordination rule); In re 250 Bell Road, 388 A.2d 297 (Pa. 1978) (switching 
from first in time rule to subordination rule). 
137. All the examples considered infra involve, at least in part, security 
interests under Article 9 of the UCC. 
138. Previous scholarship found no such cases. See Sutherland, supra 
note 117, at 519 n.15. Current research has similarly failed to unearth 
them. For a discussion of why no UCC circular priority cases have been 
litigated, and why eventually such cases are likely to surface, see id. 
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under the UCC.139 
First, circular priorities involving fixtures140 can arise be-
cause the UCC permits filings in both the local real estate 
records and in the state "Article 9" records.141 While the for-
mer is effective against all subsequent interests, the latter 
gives no priority over subsequent real estate interests. Thus if, 
(i) A obtains a security interest in an electric range installed 
on Blackacre, but only files in the Article 9 r~cords; (ii) B ob-
tains a personal security interest and files in the local real 
estate records; and then (iii) C obtains a real estate interest 
over Blackacre (e.g., a mortgage); we get the now-familiar set 
of circular priorities:142 
139. For a more detailed explanation of these examples, along with 
other sets of UCC rules giving rise to circular priorities, see Stephen I. 
Mclntoch, Note, Priority Contests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Purposive Interpretation of a Statutory Puzzle, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 1155 (1986); Sutherland, supra note 117, at 518-19; White, supra 
note 121, at 232-33; see also Sherman S. Hollander, Imperfections in 
Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 683, 691 (1963). 
140. "The law of fixtures deals with relationships to objects that fall in 
a gray area between 'real property' and 'personal property!" 5 POWELL & 
RoHAN, supra note 129, 11 648 (containing a collection of cases on disput-
ed items). See also J . H. Crabb, Annotation, Carpets, Linoleum, or the 
Like as Fixtures, 55 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1957 & Supp; 1987); R. P. Davis, An-
notation, Electric Range as Fixture, 57 A.L.R.2d 1103 (1950 & Supp. 
1994); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Sprinkler System as Fixture, 19 A.L.R.2d 
1300 (1951 & Supp. 1996). 
141. See U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(b) (1995). 
142. For a different set of fixture rules leading to cycles, see Hollander, 
supra note 139, at 691 (arguing that the fiXture lien provision of the 
1974 version of U.C.C. § 9-313 gave rise to circular priorities). 
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state filing trumps 
subsequent personalty 
security interest 
local filing trumps all 
subsequent security interests 
Figure 7 
The second example involves the interaction of the consign-
ment rules of UCC Article 2 with Article 9 security interests. 
When an owner (the "consignor") consigns goods for resale by a 
seller (the "consignee"), he must take steps to preserve his 
rights as against other creditors of the consignee.143 In addi-
tion to filing to notify future creditors, the consignor m:ust also 
give direct notice to existing inventory-secured creditors.144 A 
cycle can then arise if consignor A gives notice to existing cred-
itor B but not to existing creditor C, and B filed before C, then 
A will trump B, who in turn trumps C, who in turn trumps A. 
c. Interaction of State and Federal Law 
i. Federal Tax Liens 
Even if state rules somehow prevent the possibility of circu-
lar priorities, their interaction with federal law may lead to the 
same conundrum. Historically, one of the most common in-
stances of circular priorities arose in the interaction of federal 
143. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1995). 
144. See U.C.C. § 9-114 (1995). 
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and state tax liens. 145 Before the Federal Tax Lien Act of 
1966/46 federal tax liens had priority over "inchoate" local 
property tax liens- essentially, those not reduced to judgment 
for a specific amount.147 Congress, however, had subordinated 
federal tax liens to recorded security interests. 148 Since the 
usual state law rule is that property taxes trump even security 
interests, the following set of circular priorities often arose: 
u.s 
(federal tax lien 
Figure 8 
local government 
(property tax lien) 
While the 1966 Act inter alia solved this particular problem 
by subordinating federal tax liens to property tax liens, 149 it 
by no means removed the possibility of circular preferences as 
a result of grafting federal tax liens onto state priority rules. 
Federal tax liens still enjoy priority over most "i~choate~ liens, 
and as a result, courts still must deal with cases like In re 
Stump.150 In Stump, plaintiffs wives had dower rights that, 
under Ohio law, gave them priority over a judgment lien hold-
er. Their dower rights were inchoate (their existence and 
amount had not been determined), however, and so the federal 
tax lien took priority. Finally, federal tax law gave the choate 
145. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.3, at 1032. 
146. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-23 (1954) (amended 1966). 
147. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.3. 
148. See id. 
149. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(6)(A). 
150. 193 B.R. 261 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995). 
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judgment lien priority over the federal tax lien.161 If we sub-
stitute the inchoate dower claim for the local property tax lien 
in the figure above, and the judgment lien for the mortgage, 
we have a structurally parallel cycle of priorities. 
ii. BankrUptcy 
In bankruptcy law, as in tax law, Congress has enacted 
legislation to untangle circular priorities. Under § 67 of the old 
Bankruptcy Act, 152 which gave certain unsecured claims 
(such as administrative expenses in bankruptcy) limited spe-










While Congress solved this problem in 1966,154 it by no 
means rid the bankruptcy laws of the possibility of circular 
priorities. For instance, spbordination agreements can combine 
with bankruptcy law to create cycles distinct from the "pure" 
subordination cycles previously discussed. 156 Suppose B ob-
151. See id. at 265. 
152. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(3) (repealed 1977). 
153. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.3. 
154. While Congress amended § 67 of the old Bankruptcy ..Act in 1966, 
the same substantive result continues under the new Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 724(b) (1993). See John C. McCoid, ll, Preservation of Avoided Trans-
fers and Liens, 77 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1110-11 (1991). 
155. This example is loosely based on In re &rs, Inc., 819 F.2d 19 (2d 
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tains a first mortgage on Blackacre, and A obtains a second 
mortgage.156 While B makes the proper filing, A does not. 
Later, B subordinates his claim to A's for valuable consider-
ation. If the owner of Blackacre then goes bankrupt, the trust-
ee managing the estate can "avoid" A's mortgage since it was 
not filed ("perfected").157 A maintains priority over B due to 
the subordination agreement.158 Finally, to complete the cir-
cle, B has priority over the trustee since he properly filed his 
mortgage and put the world on notice of his interest. 






B obtained mortgage 
before C 
Figure 10 
156. GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL EsTATE TRANSACTIONS 531-34 (1993) (dis-
cussing the rights of junior lienors). 
157. The trustee has this power under the so-called "strong-arm" provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1993), which gives 
the trustee the power to avoid any and all interests over which a <hYPo-
thetical) judgment creditor would have priority on the day the bankrupt-
cy petition is filed. Under 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1993), any interests avoided 
under § 544 are preserved for the benefit of the estate. Accord Kors, 819 
F.2d at 23. 
158. This is the central holding of Kors. See 819 F.2d at 23. While the 
trustee steps into A's shoes in tenns of the security interest avoided, the 
trustee cannot step into A's shoes regarding side deals such as the sub-
ordination agreement. 
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Note that similar cycles can arise based on other provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code. For instance, continuing the above 
example, even if A properly recorded his mortgage, the trustee 
would still have priority over A's interest if A received .it "too 
close" to the bankruptcy filing; such "preferences" are void-
able.169 If B's mortgage was free of any such flaw, we have 
another case of circular priorities. 
Indeed, the trustee's ability to avoid preferential transfers 
made on the eve of bankruptcy can produce cycles even with-
out subordination agreements. It is possible that A will have a 
firSt mortgage that is voidable as a preference while B will 
have a second mortgage that is not so voidable. 160 If so, we 
immediately have the following cycle:181 
A received a 
voidable preference 
bankruptcy trustee 
B's mortgage not 
. A prevails under 
recording act 
a voidable preference 
Figure 11 
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1993). 
160. This can happen in a variety of ways. For example, if B receives 
his second mortgage, not for an existing debt, but in exchange for new 
consideration, there is no voidable preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 54 7(c)(1) 
(1993). 
161. This example is derived from McCoid, supra. note 154, at 1091-92. 
McCoid argues that 11 U.S.C. § 551, which "preserves" voided transfers 
for the benefit of the estate, should be interpreted to break such cycles 
in favor of the trustee in cases where bankruptcy law only partially 
supersedes state law. See id. at 1093. It appears that most courts apply 
the subordination rule, discussed supra Part IV .Al.a, in so breaking the 
cycle. See id. at 1091, 1093. McCoid discusses a host of other situations 
where circular priorities can arise under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 
1104-10. 
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· 2. Exploring the Complexity of Cyclical Priorities 
While the variety of situations in which circular priorities 
can arise may be a bit overwhelming at fll'St, none of the ex-
amples discussed above appears very "complex." While courts 
have missed even such simple cases,162 it is ·nonetheless gen-
erally not difficult to detect circular priorities when the num· 
her of claimants is, for example, three. 
The essential lesson of CCT, however, is that fmding cycles 
becomes much more difficult when the number of·parties in-
creases by an even modest amount. This section illustrates the 
problem by iteratively constructing an example so complex that 
it is virtually impossible, even with the help of a computer, to 
fmd all of the circular priorities embedded in the fact pattern. 
Again, despite failure of earlier works to address this difficulty, 
fmding circular priorities is obviously a necessary prerequisite 
to dealing with them. 
Suppose that, in a notice jurisdiction, A obtains a first mort-
gage on Blackacre but fails to record. B and C obtain subse-
quent interests, with knowledge of A's mortgage and record. 
Then D and E obtain interests without knowledge of A's unre-
corded lien. With only five parties we have a relatively complex 
picture with many cycles (how many?). 
Figure 12 
162. See, e.g., Ursana v. Bank of Denver, 354 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1960), 
cited in GILMORE, supra note 120, § 39.3, at 1032 n.l (noting that the 
court failed to observe a simple cycle created by failure to perfect an ap-
peal). 
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F then obtains an interest, fails to record, and bargains to 
subordinate C's interest to hers. Then G, with knowledge ofF's 
interest, records. H, without knowledge ofF's or A's unrecord-
ed interests, obtains an interest and records. Now the situation 
is even more daunting: 
Figure 13 
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With only eight parties, and a modicum·of dealings between 
them, it is now extremely taxing for a human to enumerate all 
the cycles, a seemingly necessary fli'St step on the path to 
dealing with them. Moreover, if we add only a few more par-
ties, we can construct an example that is so complex that a 
computer cannot list all the cycles in any reasonable amount of 
time: 
Figure 14 
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Things get even worse if different types of circular priorities 
can combine to generate complexity. This happens in practice. 
In re Tuggle/63 for instance, involved a federal tax lien cycle 
on top of a state recording act cycle (that included state tax 
liens).164 
Before moving on to other legal rules that raise problems 
under CCT, the next two sections briefly present cycles that 
arise in different legal regimes. 165 
3. Circular Corporate Voting Schemes 
For obvious reasons, corporate law long forbade management 
from voting treasury shares (shares of its own stock owned by 
the corporation): "It is not to be tolerated that a Company 
should procure stock in any shape which its officers may wield 
to the purposes of an election; thus securing themselves 
against the possibility of removal . . . . "166 If a corporation ob-
tains a controlling block of its own shares, and if management 
could vote those shares, it would be impossible for the true 
owners of the corporation to oust management. Thus, all juris-
dictions, in one way or another, forbid management from vot-
ing treasury shares and their voting equivalents. 167 
163. 30 B.R. 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983). 
164. See id. at 719. 
165. Not all problems involving circular relationships are intractable. A 
recent article, for example, demonstrated that it is possible to calculate 
the "true" owners of a corporation when some shares are owned by cor-
porations in a cyclical relationship (a phenomenon discussed in the fol-
lowing section). See Stephen B. Land, Strange Loops & Tangled Hierar· 
chies, 49 TAX L. REV. 53 (1993) (solving a cyclical ownership problem 
with a standard linear algebra technique that runs in cubic time). 
166. Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426, 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 182E)). 
167. See 5 WILLIAM MONROE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2026 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990). 
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A corporation voting its own stock can be thought of as a 
one-element cycle. 
A Corporation 
firt1, Treasury 4:g!J Shares --------+---. 
i 
Figure 15 
The next logical step, for management wishing to entrench 
itself, was to move on to a two-element cycle, by placing shares 
of the parent (call it A) in a wholly-owned subsidiary (B), thus 
evading the rule against voting treasury shares and yet retain-
ing control over votes. 
Corporation A 





The courts had little trouble extending the rule against voting 
treasury shares to this slightly more complex example. ''The 
actual substance of the affair is not changed by the fact that 
462 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.49:403 
the nominal ownership of the shares in question remain [sic] 
in corporation B."168 Judges extended this rule to cover both 
cases in which stock was owned by controlled (though not 
wholly-owned) subsidiaries, 169 and cases in which manage-
ment salted away controlling blocks in a number of differe~t 
entities.170 
168. O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 59 A. 321, 322 (N.J. Ch. 
1904), aff'd, 62 A. 408 (N.J. 1905). 
169. See Italo Petroleum Corp. v. Producers Oil Corp., 174 A. 276, 278 
(Del. Ch. 1934) (ruling that statute on treasury share voting, with words 
"directly or indirectly" applied to shares owned by a 99% owned subsid-
iary: "What can 'indirectly' mean unless it be some such thing as having 
stock belonging to the corporation held in some third party's name and 
having that third party vote it?"). But see Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman 
Brewing Co., 595 F. Supp. 1385, 1398-99 (D. Del. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 
152 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding relationship between entity holding shares 
and target corporation not close enough to infer that management of 
target controlled voting of its own shares). 
170. In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984), 
Norlin's management responded to a takeover offer by placing Norlin 
stock in both a wholly-owned subsidiary and in an employee stock owner-
ship program (ESOP) controlled by Norlin's board. The court, finding that 
management "amass[ed] voting control of close to a majority of a 
corporation's shares in their own hands by complex, convoluted and delib-
erative maneuvers," id. at 265, invalidated both moves. 
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If a two·element cycle of ownership cannot fool courts, why 
not try three? That apparently was the thinking of the liti· 
gants in Speiser v. Baker.111 Together, Speiser and Baker con· 
trolled only a third of Health·Chem's stock at the start of the 
game but, through a series of machinations, they gained con· 







(simplified version of court's diagram) 
Figure 17 
Thus, while Speiser .and Baker controlled only 20% of Health· 
Chern's shares directly, by placing additional shares in Health· 
Med, which they controlled, they were able to vote, in total, 
60% of Chern's shares.173 This setup was sufficiently subtle 
171. 525 A2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
172. This is a simplified version of the court's diagram, see id. at 1004, 
abstracting away from complications created by preferred and convertible . 
shares. 
173. See id. at 1003-05. 
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that the majority shareholders did not realize that they had 
been effectively disenfranchised for years. The scam came to 
light only after Speiser and Baker had a falling-out.174 The 
court extended the rule against voting treasury shares to reach 
this case of extended indirect voting of treasury shares. 175 
Trying to detect circular voting highlights the need to find 
all cycles in a system. Consider the following example: 
.. Target" Corporation 
Corporation X 
Corporation Z Corporation Y 
Figure 18 
Control of "Target" Corporation may well depend on the ability 
of the hidden owners to control Y Corporation via a circular 
voting structure involving Corporations X and Z. Thus control 
of Target depends on a cycle ·that does not involve Target. 
174 .. See id. at 1005. 
175. See id. at 1012 ("[l]t is hard to imagine that a valid corporate 
purpose is served by perpetuating a structure that removes from the 
public shareholders the practical power to elect directors other than those 
supported by management."). 
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4. Criminal Conspiracies 
The common law governing parties to a conspiracy provides 
a final example of rules that raise CCT complications in bigger 
cases. Determining the extent of a single conspiracy is a cru-
cial battleground between prosecutors and defendants for a 
number of reasons. Prosecutors generally try to define a con-
spiracy as broadly as possible because, inter alia: each co-con-
spirator is liable for criminal acts in furtherance of the conspir-
acy by all other co-conspirators; statements by one conspirator 
during the course of the conspiracy are admissible against co-
conspirators as a hearsay exception; and, if there is an overt 
act requirement, the act of one co-conspirator makes the rest 
subject to prosecution.176 
Conspiracies fall into two basic categories, along with a 
hybrid: chains, wheels, and chain-wheel conspiracies (which 
combine features of both).177 
Chain conspiracies typically involve a series of distributors 
of an illicit substance (narcotics or bootlegged alcohol). In order 
for the prosecutor to treat all the participants as members of a 
single conspiracy, she need not prove they all met and mutual-
ly agreed to a grand scheme. Rather, it is enough if each co-
conspirator ''by reason of [her] knowledge of the plan's general 
scope, if not its exact limits, sought a common [illegal] 
end."t7s . 
Wheel conspiracies, as their name suggests, involve circular 
relationships, and this leads to CCT difficulties. At the center 
of the wheel is the hub, a defendant who had contact with 
many other members of the charged conspiracy. The hub's 
contacts with the other defendants form the spokes of the 
wheel.179 To complete the analogy to a wheel, and thus per-
mit treatment as a single conspiracy, the prosecutor must es-
tablish the rim of the wheel as well: 
For a wheel conspiracy to be complete-i.e. for it to be fair 
176. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 29.07[B] 
(1987); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL 
LAW § 6.5(d) (2d ed. 1986). 
177. See DRESSLER, supra note 176, at § 29.07[C]. 
178. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947). 
179. See DRESSLER, supra note 176, at § 29.07[C][1]. 
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to say that there exists a single conspiracy that includes the 
hub and all of the spokes-there must be a rim around the 
wheel. That is, one must be able to draw a line around the 
wheel connecting the spokes. If this cannot be done then 
there is no single conspiracy; rather there exist [sic] as many 
[chain] conspiracies as there are spokes in which the mem-
bership of each conspiracy consists of the hub and the indi-
vidual spoke. 180 
In order to establish the rim, "circumstances must lead to an 
inference that some form of overall agreement exists;"181 
there must be some "drawing of all [co-conspirators] together 
in a single, over-all, comprehensive plan."182 
As with circUlar priorities, it is not difficult to identify all 
the potential wheels (circular relationships) when the number 
of conspirators is small, or the structure of their relationships 
is simple. In a large international drug conspiracy, however, it 
is easy to imagine cases in which neither of these conditions 
holds. In addition to a large number of potential co-conspira· 
tors, it is possible that a wheel conspiracy will have multiple 
hubs, and in turn one of the hubs may be part of the rim in 
relation to the other hub or hubs. There may be multiple con-
spiracies, in which the hub of one conspiracy is a spoke in 
another. The courts might well find themselves facing dia-
grams no less complex than the daunting property reco~dation­
cycle example previously presented!83 In the criminal law, 
problems like this may be of constitutional dimension; a defen-
dant in a complex conspiracy could plausibly argue that a rule 
too difficult to apply is void for vagueness. 
B. Creditor Classes in Bankruptcy 
CCT has implications for rules beyond those capable of gen-
erating circular relationships among the parties. The frrst such 
example involves classifying creditors in reorganizations under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.184 Any party proposing a 
180. ld. 
181. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1335 (9th Cir, 1981). 
182. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558. 
183. See supra Part IV.A2, fig. 14. 
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
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reorganization plan must divide creditors into classes whose 
members will receive equal treatment in most cases.185 All 
members placed together in a class must have claims that are 
"substantially similar. "186 
Classification is important since the voting and approval 
rules operate primarily in terms of the classes. To simplify a 
bit, each class must either: (i) be "unimpaired" - i.e., receive 
100 cents on the dollar; (ii) vote to accept the plan, in most 
cases by two-thirds of the dollars of claims, and one-half of the 
number of claimants; or (iii) be treated fairly and not be dis-
criminat~ against (in a so-called cram-down reorganiza-
tion).187 
The following notation will help to conceptualize the classifi-
cation process. First, we have the set of all claimants, {c1, 
c2, ... }. Then we have a collection of all possible classes, {K1, 
K2, ... }; the only restriction placed on these classes is that all 
members must be substantially similar.188 
K1 = {c1, c2} 
K2 = {c1, c2, c3} (note: K1 and K2 are the only possible 
classes containing c1) 
K3 = {c2, c3, c17} 
The examples given here may seem counter-intuitive in two 
respects. 
First, they reflect the fact that while claims must be similar 
before they can be classed together, case law has explicitly 
rejected the converse notion that all "substantially similar" 
claimants must be classed together.189 Thus, the fact that the 
second possible class, K2, tells us that claims one, two, and 
three are similar, in no way rules out a plan's proposer from 
choosing a class that contains only claims one and two (i.e., 
K1). 
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
187. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
189. See In re United States Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
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Second, it may seem strange that: 
(i) Kl tells us that claim one is similar to claims two and 
three, 
(ii) K2 tells us that claims two and three are similar to claim 
seventeen, and yet 
(iii) K3, along with the note after K2, tells us that claim 
one is not similar to claim seventeen. 
This merely illustrates that the relationship "substantially 
similar" among claimants is not transitive. An example should 
help illustrate why this is so. Consider defining two cities as 
being "close" if it takes less than twelve hours to drive between 
them in a car. New York and Pittsburgh are close, as are Pitts-
burgh and Chicago, yet Chicago and New York are not close. 
To the extent a plan classifies claims based on amount or other 
quantities akin to distance, the similarity relationship among 
creditors will not be transitive. 190 · 
Taken together, the ability to place similar claims in sepa-
rate classes and the nontransitivity of claims, give the drafter 
of a plan some flexibility in classification. A plan proposer's 
flexibility in classifying claims, however, is far from unlimited. 
There must be some limit on the debtors power to classify 
creditors . . . . The potential for abuse would be significant 
otherwise . . . . If the plan unfairly creates too many or too 
few classes, if the classifications are designed to manipulate 
class voting, or if the classification scheme violates basic 
priority rights, the plan cannot be confirmed.191 
The most common "gerrymander" is to create an artificially 
large number of classes in order to insure that: (i) there is a 
class of creditors that, despite the fact that their claims are 
impaired, will vote for the plan; and (ii) any claims that are 
similar to this class, but whose votes against it would outweigh 
190. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (permitting a 
separate class of small claims). 
191. In re Holywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted); In re Bryson Properties XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 
1992) (adopting the language of Holywell Corp.); see also In re Greystone 
III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that "thou 
shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an 
affirmative vote on a reorganization plan"), modified, 995 F.2d 1274, cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 822 (1992). 
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the favorable votes, are placed in a separate class which is 
susceptible to cram-down or other unfavorable treatment. 
Although it is not always clear what courts would label "ger-
rymandering," one seemingly simple way to eliminate the prac-
tice described in the previous paragraph would be to require 
the use of the smallest number of classes that includes every 
creditor.192 Unfortunately, this seemingly innocuous and 
straightforward-sounding "solution" is actually an intractable 
task.193 Paradoxically, what seems like an easy solution is 
actually quite complex in larger bankruptcies.194 As judges 
flesh out the meaning of "gerrymandering" in the context of 
classifying claimants in reorganizations, they will have to fmd 
a ·more workable definition of the term, at least for those cases 
with many creditors. 
C. Impossibly Complex Terms in Contracts 
In addition to the statutory schemes analyzed in the previ-
ous section, it is also possible for the parties to bring intracta-
ble contract disputes before a court. ·For instance, every year 
medical school graduates are matched with hospital residency 
training programs in a nationwide "marriage" process that 
attempts to optimize the pairings. 195 
While simple versions are sometimes tractable, such "mar-
riage" problems are quite often NP-c.196 If so, whatever 
192.' If a creditor is included in more than one of the classes in this 
minimal set of classes, the plan's proposer has the power to choose the 
class in which to include the creditor, subject to the rule against gerry~ 
mandering. See United States Truck, 800 F.2d at 585-86. 
193. This is known as the "minimum cover problem," and it was shown 
to be in complexity class NP-c. See Robert M. Karp, Reducibility Among 
Combinatorial Problems, in COMPLEXITY OF COMPUTER COMPUTATIONS 85 
(R.E. Miller & J.W. Thatcher eds., 1972); see also GAREY & JOHNSON, 
supra note 98, at 222. 
194. Bankruptcy is an area of the law where large cases are relatively 
common. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. 
195. See generally STANLEY ZASLAU, MATCH SUCCESS: A STUDENT-TO-
STUDENT STRATEGY GUIDE FOR APPLYING TO RESIDENCY TRAINING PRo-
GRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994); AMERICAN MEDICAL STU-
DENTS Ass'N, AMSA's STUDENT GUIDE TO THE APPRAISAL & SELECTION 
OF HOUSE STAFF TRAINING PROGRAMS (2d ed. 1986). 
196. See IIAREL, supra note 82, at 173; see also GAREY & JOHNSON, 
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matchings the residency programs propose are generally sub-
optimal. If a medical student challenged the procedure as im-
perfect and cited documents aspiring to an ideal solution, a 
court would face an intractable problem in assessing the claim. 
It is generally not possible even to assess whether a proposed 
matching is relatively good, since the optimum is unknown. At 
a minimuin, then, those conducting large-scale pairing opera-
tions should include a prominent disclaimer that they cannot 
' generate an optimal solution, and further that they cannot 
even assess the relative merits of whatever heuristic technique 
they are using to produce a matching. 
While complexity in such "marriage" problems, as in our 
previous examples, increases with the number of parties in-
volved in the problem, trouble arises from a different source in 
large-scale construction (and other involved) contracts that 
include detailed agreements on scheduling successive tasks. "A 
major project may have thousands of activities, with each sub-
contractor generally performing a different activity."197 Con-
tractors face a daunting task in trying to calculate a feasible 
completion date with so many subtasks to coordinate; the task 
becomes more complex with each additional subtask. 
Schedules in contracts have important legal implications. 
Perhaps the most prominent example is delay damages. Cus-
tomers may sue the contractor, the contractor may sue sub-
contractors, and the subcontractors may in turn sue suppliers, 
for any and all costs that each faces as the result of another 
party's failure to adhere to the schedule. . 
The construction industry most commonly uses a scheduling 
technique called the critical path method ("CPM").198 
CPM . . . subdivides all the tasks into their 'most discrete 
components and differentiates between those construction 
activities that can't be started until other activities are fin-
ished and those that can be performed concurrently. Some 
delays in one activity might set off a chain reaction, ultimate-
ly preventing the project from being completed by the desired 
supra note 98, at 221-23. 
197. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL AsPECTS OF ARcHITECTURE, ENGINEERING 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 26.05, at 560 (1994). 
198. See MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION PROJECT SCHED· 
ULING 27-28 (1992). 
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date. Any activity that would have such an effect is said to be 
"on the critical path. 199 
The use of CPM is now widespread,200 and no wonder. Proper 
scheduling can reduce completion time by 40%, while poor 
scheduling can quadruple the time needed to put up a large 
structure. 201 
Inevitably following widespread use in the real world, litiga-
tion over the application of CPM scheduling has become rou-
tine. "[l]t is rare to witness a claim litigation or arbitration 
case where planning and scheduling techniques, in particular 
CPM, are not part of the case."202 Litigation over damages 
has been quite common: "[o]ne should not underestimate the 
relevancy of a formalized planning and schedule technique as 
it relates to claims-especially the quantification of damages 
aspect of claims."203 The courts have accepted CPM as a valid 
and enforceable contract term.204 
Unfortunately, many CPM tasks relevant to scheduling large 
construction projects are intractable.205 As with matching 
199. See supra note 156, at 898. 
200. "The government now requires [CPM or similar] analyses on most, 
if not all, major construction projects." John M. Wickwire et al., Critical 
Path Method Techniques in Contract Claims: Issues and Developments, 
1974-1988, 18 PuB. CONT. L.J. 338, 340 (1989). A survey taken in the 
late 1980s showed that 20% of all contractors used CPM or similar tech-
niques for scheduling. See JAMES J. ADRIAN, CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS, A 
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 192 (1988). 
201. See CALLAHAN, supra note 198, at 1. 
202. ADRIAN, supra note 200, at 225. 
203. ld. at 192-93. 
204. See, e.g., Wilner v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 241, 255-56 (1991) 
(relying heavily on CPM to determine fault for delay); Pathman Constr. 
Co. v. Hi-Way Elec. Co., 382 N.E.2d 453, 460 (lll. App. Ct. 1978) (citing 
the role of computers and techniques like CPM as aids in calculating 
damages); Natkin & Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 347 F. Supp. 17, 25 
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (rejecting simpler approach unable to capture all the 
subtleties that CPM can model). But see Titan Pac. Constr. Corp. v. 
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 630, 637 (1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (fmding that CPM, though useful, is not always contractually bind-
ing). 
205 . . See JEROME D. WIEST & FERDINAND K. LEVY, A MANAGEMENT 
GUIDE TO PERT/CPM 105-06 (2d ed. 1977) ("Scheduling projects with 
limited resources is a type of problem that mathematicians refer to as a 
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problems' the parties and any factfinder will have to rely on 
heuristic algorithms, and, again, there is no general way to 
assess the merits of a proposed solution. This raises a host of 
legal problems; perhaps most prominently, how a court should 
calculate delay damages since it cannot measure the length of 
the delay to the project due to a defendant's failure to perform 
on time. Courts rely on CPM to provide a benchmark. 206 For 
some questions in sufficiently large cases, however, calculating 
this benchmark is simply not feasible. 
D. Are These Really Problems? (Or, Why CCT Matters) 
Cases large enough to raise CCT concerns may be rare. 
There are five reasons, however, why it is important for the 
legal community to recognize and understand the type of prob-
lem raised in this article. First, it is precisely in large cases 
that formal rules seem to offer the most guidance to judges 
and juries, but this article demonstrates that formal, mechani-
cal rules do not always translate into useful ones. 
Second, the number of large cases litigated is increasing, 
and the size of such cases seems to be growing. A recent bank-
ruptcy case involved literally "hundreds of thousands of credi-
tors ,"207 and cases with hundreds or even thousands of credi-
tors have become commonplace.208 Huge bankruptcies in in-
dustries that often have complex interrelationships among 
participants, like retail stores209 and finance,210 increase the 
large combinatorial problem ... even [CPM], aided by the largest and 
fastest computers, can solve only small projects-those well under 100 
activities."). I d. For a parallel result on the program evaluation and re-
view technique (PERT), which allows for uncertainty in completion times, 
see GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 218 (discussing "minimizing 
dummy activities in PERT networks"). 
206. "Schedules are an important part of proving (or refuting) delay 
claims because they provide a detailed medium for comparing and mea-
suring time and intent." BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, 
CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 9.1 (1986). 
207. In re General Dev. Corp., 84 F.3d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996). 
208. See, e.g., Steve Kukolla, Sycamore Executives Clean Up in Shut-
down, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 18, 1996, at A1 (including "[m]ore than 
1,000 creditors"); Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Merksamer Unit of Hooker 
Files Under Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1989, at B12 (including 
"hundreds of unsecured creditors"). 
209. See Campeau's Woes: Bankruptcy Petition Brings Fresh Risks for 
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likelihood that creditor cycles will occur. As the frequency of 
such cases continues or increases, so does the likelihood that 
courts will find themselves trying to solve intractable prob-
lems. 
Third, CCT raises the specter of parties using legal complex-
ity to accomplish socially undesirable ends. Given the low 
expense of incorporation, for example, managers could con-
struct a complex network of interrelated firms and hide a very 
long circular voting structure inside this corporate web. For 
example, shareholders never detected even the relatively sim-
ple three-entity cycle in Speiser v. Baker.211 There would be 
no systematic way for shareholders, or for a court, to detect, for 
instance, a fifty-entity voting cycle purposefully embedded in a 
hundred-entity network of interrelated corporations.212 To 
take another example, a bankruptcy court found that "[t]he 
difficulty in tracing the obligation of claims against [a number 
of creditors affiliated with the debtor] was ... completely at-
tributable to the labyrinth that [the debtor] created. ))213 The 
law must be aware of just how impenetrable parties can make 
such a purposefully constructed labyrinth. 
Fourth, drafters of legal rules should be cognizant that, 
simply because they sound precise, this in no way insures that 
sets of rules will be workable for large cases. Unless reason-
ably sure that large cases will never arise in the area that a 
rule covers, rule-makers should not create rules that will prove 
intractable in large cases. 
Finally, the next section demonstrates that, in addition to 
exposing problems with specific laws and providing guidance 
for lawmakers, the CCT has broader implications for some 
recurring issues in legal complexity. 
·Allied, Federated, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1990, at A1 (noting that "[t]he 
filing immediately affects ... about 300,000 suppliers, hundreds of bond-
holders, and scores of other creditors."). 
210. See Michael Siconalfi et al., The End of Drexel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
14, 1990, at Al. 
211. 525 A2d 1001, 1004 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
212. See supra Part IV .A3, fig. 18, for a smaller-scale example. 
213. Miami Ctr. Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of New York, 838 F.2d 1547, 
1552 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
THEORY 
A. The Number of Parties 
The Anglo-American legal tradition has always been uncom-
fortable with disputes involving multiple parties. It is still 
generally impossible to litigate a three-way conflict directly. 
The conflict must be formally broken down into a series of 
bipolar disputes214 and class actions are a quite recent inno-
vation. 215 CCT provides formal support for the intuitive belief 
that legal disputes will become unmanageable quite rapidly as 
the number of parties increases even modestly. Just· as the 
number of subsets of a set increases exponentially as the size 
of the set increases, so too the number of possible opposing 
coalitions increases exponentially as the number of parties 
increases. Such multifaceted, multifactional disputes have 
traditionally been decided in the voting booth, not in the court-
room.216 In crafting rules that invariably prune the number of 
parties, lawmakers and courts have seemingly recognized this 
problem. 
214. Perhaps the biggest exception to this general rule is bankruptcy, 
which requires special rules and procedures precisely because it involves 
multiple claims on assets usually insufficient to satisfy those claims. 
Other exceptions include interpleader, FED. R. CIV. P. 22, and class ac-
tions. See infra text accompanying notes 216-17. For a view of many civil 
rights cases as three-cornered, see Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law 
in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1993) (arguing that in 
some cases, due process demands that at least three distinct interests be 
involved in a single litigation). 
215. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDlEY AL GROUP LITIGATION TO 
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 10 (1987) (discussing the role of the class 
action in modern law). 
216. Note that democratic political choice has its own set of fonnal 
problems. The possibility that, in attempting to aggregate citizens' prefer-
ences, voting may endlessly cycle between outcomes, none of which can 
garner a majority. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). This "social choice" literature has grown rap-
idly in the legal community. For a skeptical assessment of many appli-
cations, see Maxwell J. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1257-86 (1994) (arguing that Arrow's criteria 
are an ideal, against which to measure, and then compare, collective 
decision-making bodies). 
1997] COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITYTHEORY 475 
The motivating assumption behind class actions is that, in 
essence, there are only two parties to a dispute. Either side 
may have numerous individuals, but "the questions of law or 
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members,n217 and this 
.strong symmetry between their interests permits the court to 
treat them as a great undifferentiated mass. Adding a new 
member to a class does not influence the complexity of the 
dispute, so courts can deal with arbitrarily large classes. If the 
courts treated each party as a new side, and had to compare 
each new party against all other parties, they would quickly 
face an intractably large number of disputes. 
The rules governing class actions show in no uncertain 
terms that although the device is permitted, the legal system 
inexorably attempts to limit the number of "sides" in a case. 
The Manual devotes an extended section218 to the manage-
ment of class actions, and repeatedly focuses on cabining the 
number of disputants. First and foremost, it warns that 
"[r]arely should more than one [class] be certified ... "219 A 
case with twenty classes would be at least as complex as a case 
with twenty individual parties. Even within a class, The Man-
ual counsels limiting the number of perspectives a class may 
present. "In the interest of manageability, however, rarely 
should more than ten persons or firms be named as class rep-
resentatives. n22o 
Further, judges have the power to manage the number of 
counsel they deal with, e.g., by appointing lead counsel or 
committees of counsel.221 By continually pruning the prolifer-
ation of potential sides in disputes, the courts prevent multi-
sided litigation from becoming too complex. CCT provides a 
fresh and rigorous foundation for this behavior. 
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This is not a requirement of all class 
actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(b)(2) authorize class actions based on 
different grounds. That said, even these class actions must satisfy the 
less stringent requirement that "there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
218. See THE MANuAL, supra note 44, § 30. 
219. ld. § 30.15. 
220. ld. 
221. See Tidmarsh, supra note 45, at 1763. 
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B. Property Rights 
Moving out of the context of litigation, CCT can provide 
additional support for economic rationality of private property. 
In a famous article, Harold Demsetz observed that one of the 
largest benefits of private property is internalizing costs. He 
focused on how the sharp rise in the value of beaver pelts, due 
to European demand, led to privatization of hunti~g grounds 
among the. Montagne Amerindians of Canada's Labrador Pen-
insula.222 Under the tribe's previous communitarian land 
practices, members had little or no incentive to hunt (or re-
frain from hunting) at a sustainable rate.223 
There is no reason, in theory at least, why the Montagnes 
could not have agreed, as a community, to alter their hunting 
practices to maximize the long-term value of their beaver re-
sources. In practice, of course, the rub is negotiating costs, a 
form of transactions costs. Changing the use of property in a 
purely communitarian system requires the consent of a majori-
ty, or perhaps of everyone. Under such a system, the number 
of potential coalitions and conflicts increases exponentially as 
the number of citizens rises, as does the complexity of figuring 
out schemes of compensating rearrangements.224 In contrast, 
private property negotiations generally involve only two par-
ties, and thus pose fixed costs independent of the size of a 
society. 
C. Fuller's Polycentric Tasks 
In a famous article that anticipated both the problems with 
specific rules discussed earlier, as well as these broader con-
cerns, Lon Fuller gave a penetrating justification for the 
courts' hesitance to take on polycentric tasks involving complex 
interrelationships between parties or things.225 His analysis 
222. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PRoc. 347 (1967). 
223. See id. 
224. Lon Fuller's concept of polycentric tasks, discussed infra Part V.C, 
in some ways anticipated this view of property systems. See infra notes 
225-45 and accompanying text. 
225. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 394-404. Fuller circulated this unfin-
ished manuscript in the late 1950s, but it was not published until after 
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has striking parallels with CCT. 
Defining adjudication as the right of litigants to engage in 
the "(p]resentation of proofs and reasoned arguments,wn6 
Fuller's basic question was, "[w]hat kinds of tasks are inher-
ently unsuited to adjudication?Jtm He used a number of 
hypotheticals to argue that polycentric tasks are beyond the 
competence of adjudication. His first example involved a will 
that left a large collection of diverse, valuable paintings to the 
Metropolitan Museum and the National Gallery "in equal 
shares.'7228 Fuller explained why effecting an equal division of 
the paintings is a difficult task: 
[T]he disposition of any single painting has implications for 
the proper disposition of every other· painting. If it gets the 
Renoir, the Gallery may be less eager for the Cezanne but all 
the more eager for the Bellows, etc. If the proper apportion-
ment were set for argument, there would be no clear issue to 
which either side could direct its proofs and contentians.229 
To see how closely this resembles the difficulties raised by 
CCT, consider the case of two paintings. Each gallery will take 
one, and there are no problems of "fit" among the set taken by 
each.230 If there are four paintings, there are only six possible 
divisions and it is not that difficult to examine each for artistic 
fit. If there are twenty paintings, however, there are almost 
200,000 possible divisions into two sets of ten paintings each, 
and so finding the best one, or even a consistent one, by ex-
his death. He borrowed the term polycentric tasks from Michael Polyani .. 
See MICHAEL POLYANI, THE LoGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS & REJOIN-
DERS 171 (1951); see also Fuller, supra note 3, at 394. Fuller planned to 
expand the article into a book on "eunomics," meaning "the theory of 
good order and workable arrangements." ld. at 353. The phrase "work-
able arrangements" describes precisely the focus of CCT. 
226. Fuller, supra note 3, at 363. 
227. I d. at 393. 
228. [d. at 394. 
229. Id. 
230. This discussion assumes the paintings are of roughly equal value. 
If they are not, the parties could agree on cash side-payments to equalize 
shares. This assumption seems warranted since Fuller is not focusing on 
the problem of dividing the collection of paintings into two groups of 
equal value. Rather, he is worried about the difficulty of dividing them 
into two sets ~hat are artistically coherent. 
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haustive search is infeasible. 
Indeed, Fuller seems to have stumbled intuitively across a 
task that is intractable.zn He cites attempts to centrally de-
termine prices and wages economy-wide,232 or attempts to 
choose a football roster,233 as other instances of polycentric 
tasks. Generalizing the common element of these examples, 
Fuller argues that "the more interacting centers there are, the 
more the likelihood that one of them will be affected by a 
change in circumstances, and, if the situation is polycentric, 
this change will communicate itself after a complex pattern to 
other centers.'7234 Analogizing "interacting centers'' to connect-
ed points forming a graph, Fuller's definition of polycentric 
sounds like a close analog to questions in graph theory that, as 
we have seen repeatedly, are replete with intractable prob-
lems.235 
Although his article was written more than a decade before 
CCT developed, Fuller recognized that "[t]he relationship po-
tentially affected by these decisions are in formal mathemati-
cal terms of great complexity-and in the practical solution of 
231. We can think of each painting as a node on a graph, with edges 
connecting any two paintings that "fit" with each other. Trying to find 
larger and larger sets of paintings which all fit with each other is then 
the same as trying to fmd larger and larger sets of nodes that are all 
connected to each other. Such "totally connected" subsets of nodes are 
called cliques of graphs. Dividing up a graph into such cliques is known 
to be an NP-complete task. See GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 
193. 
232. "Each . . . separate effect may have its own complex repercussions 
in the economy. In such a case it is simply impossible to afford each 
affected party a meaningful participation through proofs and arguments." 
Fuller, supra note 3, at 394-95. 
233. "It is not merely a matter of eleven different men being possibly 
affected; each shift of any one player might have a different set of reper-
cussions on the remaining players: putting Jones in as quarterback would 
have- one set of carryover effects, putting him in as left end, another." Id. 
at 395. Note the similarity of this problem to attempting to solve the 
puzzle presented supra Part III.D. In both cases, it is easy to fit three or 
four players/pieces into place, but such a partial arrangement may be 
inconsistent with the best roster/puzzle solution. 
234. Fuller, supra note 3, at 397. 
235. See GAREY & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 199. 
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them a good deal of 'intuition' is indispensable.'J236 In addition 
to recognizing the formal mathematical nature of polycentric 
(graph theory) problems, and their complexity, Fuller realized 
that formal, optimal solutions of such problems are generally 
unattainable. His "practical solution[s)" based on "intuition" 
are simply a definition of the heuristic solutions237 that com-
puter programmers facing intractable problems must employ 
every day. 
Fuller cited three reasons why adjudication is a poor forum 
to devise heuristic solutions to complex problems.238 First, the 
"[u]nexpected repercussions" of proposed remedies would un-
dercut the effectiveness of remedies selected based on an ad 
hoc approach.239 Second, in trying to detect these hidden ef-
fects, Fuller worried that judges would commit procedural faux 
pas, such as 'sounding out' parties on possible remedies, per-
haps at ex parte hearings, and making unsupported factual 
fmdings in order to support their judgments.24° Finally, Full-
er worried that, having realized the intractability of a problem, 
judges might "reformulate the problem so as to make it amena-
ble to solution through adjudicative procedures.n241 This 
yields the right answer to the wrong question. 
Fuller's essay has been labeled as dated in light of the in-
creasing willingness of the courtS, especially the federal courts, 
to deal with disputes that look quite polycentric, such as deseg-
regation cases, with far-reaching remedial tools such as the 
structural injunction.242 While the normative debate over the 
use of the structural injunction is beyond the scope of this 
article,243 CCT strongly suggests that as a matter of positive 
236. Fuller, supra note 3, at 398 (emphasis added). 
237. See supra Part III.F. 
238. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 401. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. 
241. ld. 
242. "Fuller's essay circulated for some twenty years but it was never 
modified to address the challenges posed-both positive and normative 
-by the litigative experience of the civil rights era. The essay was pub-
lished in the late 1970s, but strikingly it always remained a statement of 
the late 1950s." ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF 
PROCEDURE 508 (1979). 
243. The seminal and still leading positive work on structural injunc-
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theory, Fuller was ahead of his time, not behind it, in focusing 
on the difficulties that polycentric disputes pose for courts. 
Fuller and CCT frame the issue as follows: to the extent that 
the cases in which courts employ involved remedies, such as 
structural injunctions are bipolar, they are well-equipped to 
solve the problem; to the extent that the dispute is polycentric, 
however, the subtleties of framing a heuristic solution are 
probably beyond the judicial competence. 
For example, Laycock244 characterizes Martin v. Wilks245 as a 
trilateral dispute. White firefighters (party one) sued their 
municipal employer (party two) for promoting minority 
firefighters (party three) based on race. If, as seems plausible, 
no other parties have a substantial interest in the dispute, 
then courts seem well able to fashion relief among three par-
ties as a small departure from their run-of-the-mill bipolar cas-
es. The number of "interacting centers" is small, the number of 
possible coalitions and side effects to consider is small, and 
thus trilateral disputes pose little difficulty from Fuller's or 
CCT's perspective. 
As the number of classes with a substantial interest in a 
dispute increases even modestly, however, Fuller and CCT 
raise serious questions about the efficacy of adjudication. Con-
sider, for example, school desegregation in a large metropolitan 
area. If the dispute really does break strictly along racial lines, 
it is bipolar and thus judicially manageable. Issues, however, 
tions is OWEN M. FISS, THE CML RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Fiss con-
tinues to be a leading supporter of the remedial device. Owen M. Fiss, 
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993). See also Janet 
Koven Levit, Rewriting Beginnings: the Lessons of Gautreaux, 28 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 57 (1994) (examining use of the structural injunction us-
ing the Gautreaux litigation as a case study); Susan P. Sturm, The 
Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1993). For a critical ap-
praisal, see Donald L. Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 129-31 (1982) (criticizing the expansion in 
judicial participation in public policymaking which has come · 
incrementally· and on an ad hoc basis); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of 
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
661, 664 (1978) (arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers "im-
pose[s] limitations on the authority of federal courts to undertake execu-
tive and legislative functions when ordering relief .. . "). 
244. Laycock, supra note 214. 
245. 490 u.s. 755 (1989). 
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may be more complicated. Income, geographic location, and 
private school choice, for example, may be important attributes 
to determining the impact of a desegregation program on indi-
vidual welfare. Middle-class African Americans in the suburbs 
may take a different view than poor inner-city African Ameri-
cans. Poor suburbanites benefitting from stronger schools may 
be at odds with their city counterparts. Parents who send their 
children to private school, and pay for the public schools (and 
thus desegregation) but do not use them, may have interests 
largely unaffected by race or geography. These four factors 
(race, income, location, and choice of private education), yield a 
minimum of 24 separate classes that may have distinct inter-
ests. Moreover, there is a huge number of possible coalitions 
among these 24 groups. 
Fuller in effect says that adjudication, like solutions to NP-c 
problems, does not scale well. As the size of a problem increas-
es from two to twenty-two million, neither courts (humans) nor 
computers can keep up with the exploding level of complexity. 
While there is, at least according to grand economic theory, 
some set of policy choices that maximize social welfare (broadly 
defmed), we would never trust a judge to issue an injunction 
setting forth every facet of social policy. The voting booth pro-
vides a procedure for sorting out the myriad of possibilities; 
voting is perhaps the ultimate heuristic solution to· a formally 
intractable problem. 
VI. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS 
In dealing with these broader concerns regarding multiplici-
ty of parties, property rights, and polycentric disputes, courts 
and commentators have been fairly sensitive to the difficulties 
posed by intractable problems. Returning to the more mundane 
topics previously discussed, such as circular priorities and 
classifying creditors,246 the question remains: what is a court 
to do when faced with a law and a fact pattern that produce an 
intractable problem? 
The first reaction of Gilmore's judges, like bulls in rage, 
might be rather drastic. Simply eliminate such rules from 
common law and statute. This, however, is unnecessary. Credi-
246. See supra Part IV. 
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tor priority rules work in almost every case despite the possi-
bility that a complex case will render them ineffective. Their 
benefits far outweigh the occasional cost of fmding a different 
rule to deal with the most involved cases, and there is no need 
for a heuristic solution when an exact solution is attainable. 
In the tough cases, however, the courts, like computer pro-
grammers, have no choice but to adopt a heuristic solution of 
one sort or another. Unfortunately, there is no single approach 
that makes sense in every complex case. The remainder of this 
section explores some of the issues relevant in choosing how to 
cut CCT's gordian knots. 
In some cases, the court might return the problem to the 
parties. For instance, in creditor priority cases, the court could 
simply declare that it would entertain proofs from the parties 
and deal with whatever cycles they managed to expose. There 
are three problems with this approach. First, it does not make 
sense in other contexts, such as setting a rule to avoid gerry-
mandering of creditor classes in bankruptcy, where the court 
sets a rule and directs parties to perform a task that is effec-
tively impossible in large cases. Second, it abdicates a court's 
responsibility to find facts. If the parties present all their in-
terrelationships as a priority problem, for instance, they in 
some sense have presented all the facts. It is the court's duty, 
not the parties', to apply the law of priorities to those raw 
facts. Finally, letting the parties decide the issue provides 
relatively well-funded litigants with a decided advantage. The 
party with greater available resources can look longer and 
harder (i.e., hire more experts and employ more computer 
time) for favorable partial solutions (ignoring any unfavorable 
cycles that the other parties and the court might not find). 
Well-bankrolled litigants, of course, enjoy any number of ad-
vantages anyway (e.g., better counsel and experts), but courts 
should at least pause before compounding potential inequities. 
If the intractable problem arises from a contract,247 the so-
lution may involve no more than the application of standard 
contract theory. When parties insert an impossible condition in 
a contract, e.g., "set the price to be paid on Jan. 1, 1997 as the 
market price on Jan. 15, 1997," the courts, of course, cannot 
247. See supra Part IV.D. 
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enforce the contract as written. They may either declare the 
entire contract a nullity (neither side having any enforceable 
rights), or try to substitute the true intent of the parties for 
the unworkable clause. In construction scheduling cases, for 
instance, a court could either appeal to a simpler, tractable 
scheduling mechanism designed to approximate its intractable 
cousin- much a like a computer programmer's heuristic- or 
the court could simply dispense with formal approaches, apply 
a good-faith standard, and decide the dispute based on the 
intuition and sense of rough justice inherent in such a criteri-
on. 
It is important that a court be candid when it abandons a 
deterministic rule for a mushy standard like good faith in a 
complex case. When applying a common-law rule, this is no 
more than the duty of a court to declare the legal basis for its 
decision; e.g, "in this complex case we cannot apply our usual 
priority rules, and so, applying our accepted common-law pow-
er to create law, we adopt the following rule: . . . . " When the 
legislature ordains a rule that is intractable in large cases, the 
courts must engage in a bit of diplomatic statutory construc-
tion; e.g, "the legislature obviously could not have meant to 
impose an intractable task on us, and so we infer that in such 
complex case they intended us to .... " As in contract cases, 
the court should look to intent (here, that of the legislature) in 
trying to find a workable heuristic approximation to an un-
workable law. Courts should not pretend they are doing the 
impossible. As · another scholar has noted, attempts to hide 
complexity with "illusory scientific accuracy" and "illusory 
precision" tend to "obscure the relevant policy choices from 
public view ."248 It is precisely such policy considerations that 
should drive the choice of a heuristic alternative to an intracta-
ble rule. 
Unlike Fuller's polycentric disputes, judges do not seem 
incapable of weighing underlying policy issues and establishing 
rules that further them. Computer programmers searching for 
heuristic solutions to NP-c problems blend the skills of the 
artist with those of the scientist. Judges are expected to weigh 
policy goals and do rough justice every day, and dealing with 
248. Flournoy, supra note 19, at 823. 
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intractable cases merely adds another entry to the list of cases 
in which they must exercise the art of judging. 
